

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**SECURITY PERCEPTION:
WITHIN AND BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH**

by

Mieczyslaw Malec

June 2003

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Jeffrey Knopf
Boris Keyser

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE June 2003	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Security Perception: Within and Beyond the Traditional Approach.			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR (S) Mieczyslaw Malec				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME (S) AND ADDRESS (ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME (S) AND ADDRESS (ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>The term "security" has always been vague in terms of its definition. After the end of the Cold War, however, this vagueness increased as new paradigms emerged. Those studying security need a better understanding of the term "security" to deal with complex issues within the broadly understood discipline of security studies.</p> <p>This thesis describes the uncertain nature of security by analyzing: (1) various definitions of security and some of the terms directly related to it in different contexts; and (2) the empirical meaning of security by examining threats as indicators of "insecurity," based on the different characters of threats, and levels of analysis from the field of international relations.</p> <p>The thesis argues that regardless of the vague meaning of the term "security," empirically its parameters are quite certain and definable by the specification of threats as indicators of insecurity. This clarification of the meaning of security studies, in turn, makes it easier for scholars and policy-makers to deal with this increasingly important sphere of human life.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS: Security, Threats, Definition, Content, Dimensions, Levels and Sectors of Security Studies, Asymmetry.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 91...	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**SECURITY PERCEPTION:
WITHIN AND BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH**

Mieczyslaw Malec
Captain, Polish Army
B.S., Koszalin Air Defense Military Academy, 1993
M.A., Warsaw National Defense University, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2003**

Author: Mieczyslaw Malec

Approved by: Jeffrey Knopf
Thesis Advisor

Boris Keyser
Second Reader

James J. Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

The term “security” has always been vague in terms of its definition. After the end of the Cold War, however, this vagueness increased as new paradigms emerged. Those studying security need a better understanding of the term “security” to deal with complex issues within the broadly understood discipline of security studies.

This thesis describes the uncertain nature of security by analyzing: (1) various definitions of security and some of the terms directly related to it in different contexts; and (2) the empirical meaning of security by examining threats as indicators of “insecurity,” based on the different characters of threats, and levels of analysis from the field of international relations.

The thesis argues that regardless of the vague meaning of the term “security,” empirically its parameters are quite certain and definable by the specification of threats as indicators of insecurity. This clarification of the meaning of security studies, in turn, makes it easier for scholars and policy-makers to deal with this increasingly important sphere of human life.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	DEFINITION OF “SECURITY”	5
III.	THREATS AS INDICATORS OF SECURITY	13
A.	THE NATURE OF THREATS.....	13
B.	“ASYMMETRIC” THREATS	17
IV.	SECURITY IN DIMENSIONS.....	25
A.	SECURITY PERCEPTION IN TERMS OF AREAS (SECTORS)	31
1.	Political Security	32
2.	Military Security	33
3.	Economic Security	35
4.	Societal Security	38
5.	Environmental Security.....	41
6.	Human Security	44
7.	Technological Security.....	46
8.	Terrorism.....	49
A.	SECURITY PERCEPTION IN TERMS OF LEVELS.....	52
1.	Global Level.....	53
2.	Regional Level	54
3.	State Level.....	56
a.	<i>National Security</i>	57
b.	<i>Security of the State</i>	59
c.	<i>Homeland Security</i>	64
4.	Individual (Personal) Level.....	65
V.	CONCLUSIONS	67
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	69
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	75

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Security Studies Matrix - Correlation between Sectors and Levels (Traditional Approach).....	28
Figure 2.	Security Studies Matrix - Correlation between Sectors and Levels (Postmodern Approach).....	29
Figure 3.	Security Studies Matrix - Correlation between Sectors and Levels (Rational Approach).....	30

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ETA	Euskadi ta Askatasuna
EU	European Union
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IW	Information Warfare
JSR	Joint Strategy Review
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
UN	United Nations
USE	United States of Europe*
USA	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Studying in the Capital of the World - the United States - is the biggest privilege for any foreigner in general, but for a Polish officer in particular. This pride arises on the one hand from appreciation of universal values such as liberty, freedom, and democracy, and on the other hand, from unquestionably good relations between the only world superpower and a small, but loyal, Central European state that has endured a very rich and painful history.

Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude:

First, to the Director of the Defense Policy Department of the Polish MoD, Mr. Lech Kosciuk, for making my studies in this prestigious school possible.

Second, to Professors Jeffrey Knopf and Boris Keyser and James J. Wirtz for sharing their impressive knowledge during classes, and for insightful comments on this thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to thank all the professors, students, and American friends I have met during my studies, for giving me the opportunity to acquire a significant amount of knowledge about the complex fields of security affairs and American culture, and for their great hospitality and help during my studies in the United States.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

At the beginning of the new millennium, the meaning of the term “security” has become vague and expansive to the degree that everything could be considered as a security issue. The twentieth century, particularly the last decade, brought enormous changes to both the world political order and technological development, which have changed overall perceptions of security. Thus, there is a need to analyze the security environment from historical, political, etymological, and semantic points of view, to understand the real nature of security, in terms of both its definition and its content based on the threats shaping the structure of security studies.

After the end of the Cold War, security studies began to interest international relations experts. This is due partly to the new political order that emerged after the collapse of the bipolar security system. Partly, however, this is a result of the emergence of a “new” character of threats that previously had not been perceived, or were given little attention.

Therefore, there is a need to rethink this complex security subfield, traditionally subordinated to the broad field of international relations. Understanding the nature of security and threats as indicators of “insecurity” will improve the ability of both social scientists and policymakers to deal with different security challenges. This thesis concentrates on the two key aspects of analysis, i.e., definition and content.

B. OBJECTIVES

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been ongoing debate over whether the field of security studies should be narrowed or broadened, or even deepened. Various perceptions of security within this debate range from Stephen Walt’s very narrow interpretation of a strictly military perspective, to the much broader view taken by Richard Ullman and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, up to Sabina Alkire’s misleading paradigm of “human security.”

This thesis seeks to clarify the real nature of security by analyzing different definitions of it and some related terms, as well as different referents of security. The thesis recommends a restructuring of the field of security studies into levels and areas (sectors), in order to clarify its very complex nature. Finally, by exploring the nature of current threats such as the recently coined “asymmetric threats,” the thesis recommends their placement within the field of security studies.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The thesis discusses the following questions:

- What is security about and what is its nature?
- How does the definition of security relate to the content of security?
- What are different referents of security, and the relations between them?
- What is the nature of different threats, and how do they relate to security?
- What are asymmetric threats and asymmetry in regard to security studies?
- How do asymmetric threats relate to the traditional and postmodern perceptions of security?
- How can security studies be structured in order to do research more efficiently?

D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The field of security studies is very complex in terms both of its definition and content. Nations’ perceptions of their security change relative to political and structural changes in the world order, and the emergence of new types of threats.

As these changes occur, many definitions have become vague and ambiguous to the degree that they obscure the already complex nature of security rather than explain it. Moreover, in order to understand the nature of security in different contexts, many terms related to the field require clear and comprehensive definitions, along with newly emerging concepts such as “asymmetry.”

In this new post-Cold War security environment, scholars have debated how to approach the new security challenges and how to shape the complex field of security

studies. Although this debate is still on the security studies agenda, much more attention is now being paid to content, with the use of such terms as the “deepening and broadening” of security studies, despite the fact that this term itself remains poorly defined. Nevertheless, three main approaches can be distinguished within the field of security studies, since its origins more than half a century ago.

The traditional approach, which characterizes the period before and during the Cold War, is often criticized for being too narrow to cover all aspects of security, concentrating on military threats only and referring to national security as the security of the state. By contrast, the postmodern approach, which emerged after the Cold War, is criticized for being too expansive as it strives to include almost all aspects of human life as security issues. These new security paradigms, instead of explaining and clarifying the field of security studies, make it even more complex and unclear, not to say misleading. Finally, the rational approach is even broader than the postmodern approach, because it takes into consideration the changing character of the world and security threats, unlike the traditional focus on use of force by one state against another.

Although it can be argued that this rational approach obliterates the meaning of security by putting all security issues into one box, the counter-argument is that it meets the requirements of the complex nature of security, opening space for new sectors reflecting the changing character of threats, and possible new levels within international security as it ranges from the bilateral to the global level. This approach not only organizes the field of security studies by sorting threats into sectors on the basis of their character, but it also demonstrates the degree to which threats from a particular sector exist at a particular level, both of analysis and of danger.

This thesis starts by examining different definitions of security and related terms, in order to show how it is perceived differently by different actors, and to evaluate what the real nature of security may be. Then, a “universal” definition of security is recommended as “Security is a real, or perceived, state when there are no threats, or when existing threats do not pose a danger to the considered object.”¹ Finally, the thesis presents the advantages of such a definition of security.

¹ See chapter II on definition of security.

Chapter III explores the content of security by distinguishing dimensions of security studies. These dimensions are the areas (sectors) that reflect different characters (types) of threats, and levels, which partly reflect the levels of analysis from the field of international relations. This chapter also includes three matrices that refer to different perceptions of security in terms of the relations between the levels and sectors, as defined by the traditional, postmodern, and rational approaches. The matrices also show the degree of correlation between sectors and levels, and seek to identify which types of threats or sectors of security are dominant at particular levels, and which are not.

Chapter IV highlights the nature of threats as indicators of security, or rather “insecurity.” The chapter examines the definitions and perceptions of threat in order to show the complexity and importance of the term “threat.” It goes on to consider “asymmetric threats,” recently perceived as new security challenges, in order to demonstrate that focusing on asymmetry per se is not productive as a scientific approach. Finally, this chapter recommends the location of asymmetric threats in the security studies matrix.

The conclusion discusses the definition of security and whether its vagueness is a problem, and the crucial importance of restructuring security studies on the basis of particular threats or groups of threats. Although definitions usually provide the basis for action, from a political perspective vagueness can be perceived as a positive feature, as it allows the parties a flexible interpretation of security issues. Structuring the field of security studies, regardless of the definition, however, allows a better understanding and response to particular security challenges.

II. DEFINITION OF “SECURITY”

When conditions in the world change, the accepted definitions of some terms can become insufficient, or even confusing, if they retain their traditional meaning. In such cases, the attempt to apply these old definitions to the changed character of the world reveals their limitations. The term “security” seems to be such a case. On the one hand, it is basic to human relations, but on the other hand the meaning of this word has changed so significantly over the centuries, and especially the last two decades, that there is a need to redefine not only security, but many terms related to security, and to introduce some new terms. Therefore, to understand the nature of security, and its meaning in different contexts, it is important to analyze some terms and definitions directly or indirectly related to security.

In all areas of life, definitions constitute the bases for action. In some scientific disciplines, where it is impossible to define a particular term, it is simply left as an axiom. Ironically, however, it might be necessary to define the term “definition,” as many purported definitions seem rather to be incomplete descriptions (or sometimes prescriptions) with little, if any, attention devoted to explaining the meaning of the term and clarifying its nature. How much does this result from the uncertain nature of the term, and how much does it result from intentional or unintentional obfuscation by humans who use the term? A partial answer to the first part of the question would be natural human limitations, as there are many things (states) that are impossible to explain by words. In addition, we perceive the world through five imperfect senses. Terms can also become insufficient, however, as a result of a changing world order. This has been the case with some important terms that are closely related to security.

To better understand the nature of security, this research considers two kinds of definitions. The first group comprises comprehensive and persuasive definitions that form the basis of the final recommended definition. The second group, however, shows the inconsistency of these definitions, both in terms of their explanatory power and lack of features needed for a definition *per se*.

The term “security” is one of the most broadly defined words known to human beings. “Security” means different things to different people, and it may even mean different things to the same person, depending on the context. The term “security” comes from the French word *sécurité* or Latin *securitas*, and by most dictionaries and encyclopedias is defined as *freedom* -- from danger, fear, deprivation, care, even from doubt. It is also defined as a *condition, quality, value, or state*.²

Bernard Brodie, more than a half century ago, defined security as a “derivative value, being meaningful only in so far as it promotes and maintains other values which have been or are being realized and are thought worth securing, though in proportion to the magnitude of the threat it may displace all others in primacy.”³ His definition focuses on the trade-off between military security and *other values* such as economic welfare and stability, and individual freedom. At the time Brodie was writing, theorists from the field of international relations devoted much attention to national security and domestic affairs such as the economy, civil liberties, and the democratic political process.⁴ Brodie viewed national security as a goal to be achieved by both military and nonmilitary means.

For Arnold Wolfers, the term security covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security.⁵ Therefore, he refers specifically to national security, although in a broader sense than only military force. He closely relates national security to national interest, and those policies designed to promote the demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals, sub-national groups, or mankind as a whole, arguing that national security designates an objective of policy distinguishable from others.⁶ Finally, he states that security is “a

² See: *Short Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 2734., *Webster New Collegiate Dictionary*, G.&C. Company, Springfield, Massachusetts, USA, pp 1037., *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, Second Edition, Unabridged, 1987, pp. 1731. Also Columbia Encyclopedia, www.bartleby.com

³ Bernard Brodie, *Strategy as a Science*, World Politics 1 (1949), pp. 477.

⁴ See: Ibid., Frederick S. Dunn, *The Present Course of International Relations Research*, World Politics 2 (October 1949), Harold D. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950., Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (December 1952).

⁵ Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXVII, Nr 4, December 1952, pp. 484.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 481.

value, of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure.”⁷ Again writing more than a half century ago, Wolfers referred to national security as an “ambiguous symbol.” What would he say now, when so many “security” paradigms have emerged that are much broader than his concept of national security and its political aspects?

Some recent discussions, written after the end of the Cold War, suggest that there has not been much progress in clarifying the term. According to Helga Haftendorn, the term “security” is ambiguous both in format and content. She asks whether security is a goal, an issue-area, a concept, a research program, or a discipline.⁸ In the end, she defines security as “value and/or system maintenance over time, and the absence of threats to it.”⁹ This is a good definition, that gives us the essence of the real nature of security.

Stephen Walt ignores security as a goal and defines it narrowly in terms of means, as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force.”¹⁰ According to him, the main focus of security studies should be the phenomenon of war. It is worth noting, however, that, four years earlier, he had strongly criticized the tendency to define security solely in military terms.¹¹ His definition, still applies to the field of security studies, however, as one sector – military security, constituting part of a much broader meaning of security as a goal, an outcome, or both at once.

Although Edward Kolodziej strongly criticizes Walt for narrowing the meaning of security to its military aspects, does not even try to define it. Instead he emphasizes the importance of asking the right question rather than advancing a particular answer to a question never fully raised.¹²

⁷ Ibid., pp. 484.

⁸ Helga Haftendorn, “The security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security,” *International Studies Quarterly* (1991) 35, pp. 3.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 5.

¹⁰ Stephen M. Walt, *The resistance of Security Studies*, Marshon Series: Research Programs and Debates, *International Studies Quarterly* (1991) 35, pp. 2.

¹¹ Stephen M. Walt, “The Search for Science of Strategy”, *International Security* (1987) 12, pp. 159-164.

¹² See Edward A. Kolodziej, “Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* (1992) 36, pp. 421-438.

In his definition, Marc Levy emphasizes the protection of national values against foreign states, again narrowing the broad meaning of security to traditional *national security*, or rather security of the state.¹³

There are also many definitions of “security” that are not really “definitions” but rather descriptions, or simply a list of referents considered within the context of security. One example is Richard Ullman’s definition of national security: “A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threaten drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within a state.”¹⁴ This simply describes the relations between threat and national security, rather than offering a definition. But even if we ignore the lack of actual definition, this description is misleading, as on the one hand, it refers to national security, which traditionally is perceived in terms of military threats, while on the other hand Ullman refers to such aspects as degradation of the quality of life for the inhabitants over a short term only, and to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations). This gives his description a much broader meaning than national security *per se*.

Similarly, Sabina Alkire, attempting to create a working definition for *human security*, confuses “definition” with “objective.” Rather than defining the term, she simply states what is the objective of human security. She writes: “The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment.”¹⁵ Her approach to the human security paradigm ignores the field of security studies, as it comprises many aspects considered within other quite precise paradigms. Such examples are numerous.

¹³ Marc A. Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?,” *International Security* (1995) 20:2, pp. 37.

¹⁴ Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” *International Security* (1983), pp. 135.

¹⁵ Sabina Alkire, *Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, 16 February 2002, <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org.doc/frame.pdf>

The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations defines security as “a term which denotes the absence of threats to scarce values.”¹⁶ This definition captures the essence of the broad nature of security and its relation with threats, although it describes security as a “term.”

The most accurate and most comprehensive definition of the term “security” is presented, however, in the Russian Federation Rules of Law related to security. Here the term security is defined as “defense (sostoyanye) of the vital interests of individuals, society, and state from internal and external threats.”¹⁷ Then, “vital interests” are defined as the “totality of needs which enable existence, and ensure the (progressive) development of individuals, society, and the state.”¹⁸ According to this definition, the main security objectives are: individual security – rights and freedoms; security for society – its physical and psychological values; and security of the state – its constitutional order, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.¹⁹ Although this definition takes into account individuals, society, and the state, at least theoretically, and narrowly considers the traditional security of the state, not to say national security, it reveals the nature of security as a “state of being,” and refers to much more than its military aspects.

Taking all the above viewpoints into account, a comprehensive definition of security could be the following: “Security is a real, or perceived, state when there are no threats, or when existing threats do not pose a danger to the considered object.”²⁰ The terms “real” and “perceived” reflect the uncertainty of the nature of security, as often “real” threats are not perceived, and conversely, perceived threats are not always real. For the purpose of this research, however, it can be further narrowed to the *perceived* aspect alone, as one can deal (prevent or fight) with perceived threats only. Even if a real, but not perceived, threat appears, it is usually too late to deal with it; one can only grapple with the results. The meaning of “considered object” in this definition refers to the

¹⁶ Graham Evans, and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin Books, 1998, pp. 490.

¹⁷ Закон Российской Федерации, О безопасности (N 2446-1 от 5 марта 1992).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ The key term “threat” is analyzed in chapter III, as an indicator of insecurity.

context in which security is considered. As was stated earlier, security has to be considered in a particular context, not only in terms of levels and sectors, but in the context of particular threats to particular objects.

Such a definition still may not be satisfactory, as one can argue that this definition is too broad and does not refer to traditionally perceived *national security*. The counterargument is that it does not have to refer to the traditional object of security. At the beginning of the third millennium C.E., there are many threats that were not perceived as threats even a few years ago (e.g., asymmetric attacks) and do not fit the traditional approach. In this new global environment, security has to embrace all of these aspects, not just a narrowly understood *national security* defined in terms of military threats to the state. Today, even the meaning of “nation” and “state” are insufficient to explain the changing nature of the world.²¹

Regardless of these concerns, the definition recommended above has at least two important advantages apart from explaining the real nature of security. First, it covers all aspects and refers to the entire content of the term “security,” at all levels and in all areas (sectors) of analysis.²² Second, it does not exclude the possible creation of subfields within the broadly understood context of security studies, or the deepening of research within separate programs, especially when new kinds of threats emerge.

Whether we like it or not, science should adjust to better understand and explain reality, not the other way around. Of course, this may not be comfortable for some experts who are afraid to lose control over their area of interest, and some politicians who are important in their area of responsibility. This is not to suggest that one has to be an expert on all aspects of security. Specialization in specific areas (sectors) and/or levels, first, would make it possible to go deeper in narrower areas, with broader knowledge coming through an exchange of research results. Second, specialization would help policymakers to deal with different types of threats as indicators of insecurity, by creating

²¹ For example, California as a state as it has its own government, constitution and territory, and the USA as a state which has only two privileges more – declaration of war and monetary policy. It is even more complicated in case of possible future of United Europe as the USE (United States of Europe). Will it be a State like the USA? What will be the status of the states which possess different security priorities, and finally what will be the official language? How can all people understand their own President of the United Europe?

specialized security institutions composed of experts on each potentially important issue or group of issues.

The next chapter analyses threats as indicators of security, as it seems that the definition of security is comprehensive when the key term threat is understood properly.

²² Sectors and Levels of analysis of security studies are presented in Chapter IV.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. THREATS AS INDICATORS OF SECURITY

Taking into consideration the uncertain nature of security and related concerns, with regard to creating a sufficient definition, it would be true to say that the only indicators, or measures, of security are particular “threats.” Analysis of a particular threat or group of threats therefore allows us to examine the area (sector) of security that is threatened. If we agree that “security is a state when there are no threats...,” this automatically suggests that the opposite state, “insecurity,” is identified by particular threats within this area of security.

This chapter examines threats and other closely related terms showing, on the one hand, their complex nature as indicators of security, and on the other hand, that sorting threats into sectors enables significant clarification of the complex field of security studies. This chapter also analyses “asymmetric threats,” and recommends their location within the general field of security studies.

A. THE NATURE OF THREATS

Threat is often defined with the use of the closely related term “danger,” which further is defined as the “possibility of something happening that will injure, harm, or kill somebody, or will damage or destroy something.”²³ Other related words are risk and hazard, but they refer to threat (danger) as a result of conscious action only. Because these terms are synonyms, they cannot be used to create a sufficient definition. The term “danger” can be left as an axiom, as everyone knows what it is about even though it is difficult to define.

The use of the term “threat” as an indicator of security in some ways parallels the narrow vs. broad security question – it can mean a deliberate military menace to another state, either overtly stated or inferred through intelligence, or it can mean any condition that puts at risk some value, and need not be related to military security.

²³ Sally Wehmeier, (ed), *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, Sixth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 316.

For Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, threat is the simplest and most obvious of all security problems.²⁴ They argue that security threats are posed when a state (or a group of states) has both the intention and capacity to circumscribe the security of another state.²⁵ However, they introduce another term related to security – “risk.” Curiously, the crucial distinction they make between threat and risk is the aspect of intention and capacity. They argue that “security may be diminished by a state that is politically unstable (thereby posing the risk of disintegration, instability, and regional conflict) or the future of which is uncertain and problematic (creating the danger of a regime with aggressive or revisionist intentions.”²⁶ David Baldwin, by contrast, defines *threat* as a passive “outcome” rather than an active “undertaking.”²⁷ Raymond Cohen, narrowing the meaning of the term to the state aspect only, argues that the perception of threat should be understood as anticipation on the part of an observer – the decision-maker – of impending harm (usually of a military, strategic, or economic kind) to the state.²⁸ Klaus Knorr, within the category of perceived threats, distinguishes “actual threats,” that is, inferred from more or less definite signals of intent, and “potential threats,” those inferred from some state of the environment or the mere capability of the opponent.²⁹

The literature on threat perception in international politics and security studies has been very much influenced by a relatively early theoretical discussion of the topic by David Singer, and refers mainly to their political and military aspects.³⁰ According to Singer, threat arises out of a situation of armed hostility, in which each body of policy-makers assumes that the other entertains aggressive designs; each side further assumes

²⁴ Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, *Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space*, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 2.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 2.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 2.

²⁷ David Baldwin, “Thinking about threats,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15 (1971), pp. 71-78.

²⁸ Raymond Cohen, *Threat perception in International Crisis*, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, pp. 5.

²⁹ Klaus Knorr, *Threat Perception, in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, ed. K. Knorr, Lawrence, Kansas 1976, pp. 78

³⁰ David Singer, “Threat Perception and the Armament Tension Dilemma,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, No. 1, (1958), pp. 93-94.

that such a design will be pursued by physical and direct means if estimated gains seem to outweigh estimated losses. Each perceives the other as a threat to its own national security, and such perception is a function of both estimated capability and estimated intent. It seems, however, that Singer overlooks the irrational and involuntary aspect of threat perception. There is no reason to believe that “capability” and “intent” uniquely determine a perception of threat, as is implied by Singer’s equation. And finally his account fails to consider the psychological dimension.³¹

In reality, threat perception rests on estimates of the past, as even the present is relative – the past directly enters the future. Nevertheless, the future can be predictable only up to a point, if at all, and information about it is not reliable. Moreover, even estimates of the past are inferences from usually fragmentary and contradictory pieces of information. Therefore, any threat perception is above all a cognitive construct which creates an image of reality as a hypothesis. “Predispositions to perceive threat derive from such sources as distrust, past experience, contingency planning, and personal anxiety. They may create systematic distortions in the perception of evidence, leading to possibilistic thinking in which future events are seen as probable that should be seen as merely possible.”³²

It must be emphasized here that the perception of threats from a scientific perspective can be different from that using a political perspective. The task of a researcher is to seek shared aspects of ostensibly diverse examples of a given phenomenon, in order to attempt to formulate some covering theory. Threats perceived by a decision-maker, however, are likely to consist of complex and unique constellations of events and circumstances. And those constellations usually are interpreted from a practical point of view in order to achieve often short-term political or economic gains.

The perception of threat can be totally different at different levels, in different conditions, and according to the different objects being threatened, or perceived to be so. Even at the personal level, perception of threats can vary significantly. For example,

³¹ Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception in International Crisis*, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, pp. 6.

³² Ibid., pp. 6-9.

although most, if not all, people consider life and health as crucial values, they perceive the threat to themselves according to their circumstances. Poor people see the main threat in terms of their basic needs, such as food, clothes, a place to live, as they have nothing to lose but their life or health. Rich people, however, may perceive the main threat to be loss of their assets. At the state level, the main threat is loss of authority (power). Governments do not necessarily pay attention to individuals unless they have to. Finally, at the global level, states still have their own security priorities, as they perceive threats in different ways. Not only do states ignore the consequences of the unequal, extensive exploitation of natural resources, leading to scarcities and global warming, and a resultant threat to future generations. They also fail to combine efforts to deal with threats independent of human activity, that are both quite obvious and serious, such as meteors. Hoyle has postulated that meteor strikes averaging 10,000 years are responsible for initiating and terminating Ice Ages.³³ Periodic global ice variations and interglacial periods last about 10,000 years, which is related to the periodicity of certain comet swarms. Our current warm interglacial period began about 10,000 years ago and may be nearing an end. Unconventional sources indicate the probability of multiple comet strikes or near misses within the next 36 years. Two such independent sources indicate that these events will start around 2006-2007 with others following in the next six to thirty-two years. At most, a two-year visual warning is anticipated.³⁴ Will states combine efforts to deal with these external threats to the Earth? Perhaps not, unless they have to. Should they? Without a doubt, yes.

Regardless of the concerns related to the definition of the synonyms “threat,” “danger,” and “risk,” and different perceptions of threats, the primary focus within security studies should be on distinguishing their different character, dividing them into particular sectors, and then examining each threat at the proper analytical level. Such an approach will lead to the identification of as many sectors and levels as reality requires, unlike now when some experts do not agree even to extend the field of security studies,

³³ Threat definition and verification, Follow-up to: Vulcan, Comets and the Catastrophe, <http://www.barrywarmkessel.com>

³⁴ Ibid.

so as not to lose control of it. Even if it is painful, we will have to adjust to the changing nature of the security environment, as we cannot adjust reality to our abilities and restraints, at least for the foreseeable future.

B. “ASYMMETRIC” THREATS

"If he (the enemy) is superior in strength, evade him. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared; appear where you are not expected."

Sun Tzu (Giles, 1910, Ch. 1)

The term “asymmetry,” like most of the terms related to security, is vague, expansive, and unclear. Even using it in the context of “asymmetric warfare” or “asymmetric threats” does not help much. Although asymmetric warfare, and asymmetric threats in particular, refer to mainstream security issues, asymmetry still does not yet have its place in security studies. Asymmetry is closely related to the military sector and the developments described as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). On the other hand, asymmetry also relates to other sectors such as economics, society, and particularly politics. Moreover, contrary to all other sectors of security, which reflect the character of threats (e.g., military security refers to military threats, environmental security to environmental threats, etc.), it would be difficult to create a separate sector for asymmetric threats such as “asymmetric security”; even the phrase itself sounds strange.

Such a distinction would not make sense even from a military security perspective, as a focus on asymmetry *per se* does not illustrate much. First, asymmetry is not a new phenomenon in the history of wars, and asymmetric approaches have been applied at all levels of warfare in the past, even if it seems as if the United States has only recently discovered the phenomenon.³⁵ Even the United States had plenty of experience in dealing with asymmetric warfare in its early years, during the Revolutionary War, and later in the conflicts between native Americans and the U.S. Army. In its current interpretation, however, asymmetric warfare broadly encompasses not only military security, but also information technology, and even psychology. Among all asymmetric

³⁵ Robert H. Allen, *Asymmetric Warfare: Is the Army Ready?*, <http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil>

threats, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) seem to be the only factor related to military security, but even here it is not clear whether nuclear weapons, for example, are a military instrument or a political means of deterrence. Second, introducing asymmetry to security studies, while a logical choice, raises concerns about how to deal with it conceptually, especially when efforts to determine the proper relations between existing security sectors has proved challenging enough.

The asymmetric approach in its current form – not the historical versions taken from Carl von Clausewitz or Sun Tzu – is as young as the equally complicated concept of human security. It arose as an attempt to adjust to the new world order after the end of the Cold War. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States became the world's sole superpower, and it has been the only country to maintain a global naval presence, extensive overseas bases, and the ability to deploy military forces to distant regions. Some in the United States began to fear that future adversaries who resort to force against the United States will probably employ asymmetric, “David-and-Goliath” strategies involving innovative yet affordable weapons and tactics designed to weaken the United States. A potential opponent might, for example, employ non-conventional means such as nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons, or conduct terrorist attacks against military or civilian targets, or both, on American territory in a bid to deter or impede U.S. intervention in a regional conflict. Such an adversary could be selective in its objectives, timing the moment of an attack to maximize its strengths.³⁶

The first explicit mention of asymmetry appeared in the 1995 Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, but the concept was used in a very simplistic, limited sense.³⁷ The doctrine defined asymmetric engagements as those between dissimilar forces, specifically air versus land, air versus sea, land versus sea. The 1995 National Military Strategy approached the issue somewhat more broadly, listing terrorism, use or threat to use weapons of mass destruction, and information warfare as asymmetric challenges. In 1997 asymmetric threats began to receive greater attention.

³⁶ See Jonathan B. Tucker, *Asymmetric Warfare*, <http://forum.ra.utk.edu/1999summer/asymmetric.htm>

³⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 10 January 1995), IV-10 and IV-11.

The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated, “U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena may encourage adversaries to use asymmetric means to attack our forces and interests overseas and Americans at home.”³⁸ In 1998, the National Defense University’s annual Strategic Assessment included asymmetric threat for the first time and devoted an entire chapter to it. The term figured in the 1999 Defense Secretary’s Report.³⁹ The same year, the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) focused solely on asymmetric threats.⁴⁰

Even today, however, more than five years after this initial interest, there is still no clear consensus definition of what asymmetry really is. The 1999 Joint Strategy Review provided the broadest official treatment of asymmetry:

Asymmetric approaches are attempts to circumvent or undermine U.S. strengths while exploiting U.S. weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the United States’ expected method of operations.... [Asymmetric approaches] generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom of action or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons or technologies and can be applied at all levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical) and across the spectrum of military operations.⁴¹

According to Steven Metz, Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute, this latest official definition of asymmetry expanded official thinking but has two shortcomings: it is specific to the current strategic environment and U.S. security situation, and it deals primarily with what an opponent might do to the United States rather than giving equal weight to how the U.S. military might use asymmetry against its opponents. He proposes a more general, complete definition of strategic asymmetry:

³⁸ Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, May 1997, Section II.

³⁹ William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1999.

⁴⁰ The Joint Strategy Review is prepared each year by the Joint Staff as part of a formal strategy development and planning process within the Department of Defense.

⁴¹ Joint Strategy Review (Washington, DC: CJCS, 1999), pp. 2.

In military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing and thinking differently from opponents to maximize relative strengths, exploit opponents' weaknesses or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational or a combination, and entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations or time perspectives. It can be short-term, long-term, deliberate or by default. It also can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches and have both psychological and physical dimensions. The key idea is that significant differences exist.⁴²

According to Kenneth McKenzie, definitions of asymmetry, while narrowly accurate, seem insufficient in explaining the phenomenon. He proposes yet another definition: "Asymmetry is leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against American vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining American will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor's strategic objective."⁴³ He adds two essential elements: first, *disproportionate effect*, emphasizing achievement of a strategic objective through application of modest resources, and second, recognition of the *psychological* component. He also explains that asymmetric warfare does not equate automatically to an attack on the homeland, which is the most extreme – and potentially most dangerous – expression of an asymmetric strategic attack.⁴⁴ It is worth noting, however, that this explanation was made almost one year before the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001.⁴⁵ Again, does asymmetry refer to differences between the potential of opponents, or rather different methods utilized to gain a "political" goal?

Definitions are not the only concern when analyzing asymmetry, asymmetric warfare, or asymmetric threats, or whatever one calls it. Another issue is the content, i.e., particular threats or groups of threats. Most often, six kinds of threats are considered asymmetrical: nuclear, chemical, biological, terrorism, information operations, and

⁴² Steven Metz, "Strategic Asymmetry", *CGSC, Military Review*, July-August 2001.

⁴³ Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., "The Revenge of The Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR," *McNair Paper 62*, pp. 2, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/macnair62/html>

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2.

⁴⁵ This event, in turn, resulted in creations of another security institution and subfield at state level – homeland security.

operational concepts.⁴⁶ There are other ideas about how to approach asymmetry as well, including “asymmetry of will,” “asymmetry of organization,” or “asymmetry of patience,” among others.⁴⁷

Asymmetry as a scientific approach, both in terms of asymmetric threats and asymmetric warfare, has little to do with security. Threats considered to be asymmetric should be located in existing or newly created sectors of security studies. Terrorism, because despite its traditional political background, should possess its own sector, because of its much broader character than political only.⁴⁸ Information asymmetry, whether in threats, warfare, or operations, should be included in the much broader technological sector, which in the future will play a crucial role beyond the military arena.⁴⁹

Last, and also least, weapons of mass destruction have not been considered in this research, as they have nothing in common with asymmetry *per se*. WMD, in spite of their different character, use, and lethality, are still only weapons. WMD posed an enormous threat even during the Cold War, when it could be said there was no asymmetry. What then qualifies them as asymmetric threats now, manner of use? What then is not asymmetric? Even during the Cold War, the lethality of WMD was a big concern. Are WMD automatically defined as an asymmetric threat, or only when used in an asymmetric pattern against a much stronger opponent? Finally, in terms of intentions WMD may be designed to balance against a stronger opponent. In this case the goal may be just to deter, not to threaten. Although Russia, for example, is economically weak, its enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons means it must be treated with respect. WMD as weapons automatically belong to the military security sector, although they often are considered to be a political means of deterrence.

After considering the preceding definitions of asymmetry and its content in terms of threats, a question arises: what is the intention of this approach? What scientific or

⁴⁶ Sometimes radiological threats are listed.

⁴⁷ See Steven Metz, “Strategic Asymmetry,” *CGSC, Military Review*, July-August 2001.

⁴⁸ Therefore, terrorism is analyzed as an inclusive part of political sector in chapter IV-B.

⁴⁹ Information issues are analyzed in chapter IV-B, as a new security sector.

practical profits can it bring, since the definitions do not explain how asymmetry refers to the disproportion of power, or to the unpredictable methods of gaining goals used by “weaker” actors.⁵⁰ Even the content is doubtful, as it includes means such as information, which has been a crucial factor on the battlefield for centuries or even millennia, and WMD, which played its deterring role a long time before the introduction this vague approach to security studies. The only threat that can justifiably be called asymmetric is terrorism. Although asymmetry always played an essential role on the battlefield at all levels, it seems that this approach first of all is nothing new, and second, artificially tries to create a new concept by putting weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and information warfare together, despite the fact that they refer to different sectors of security studies.

All in all, regardless of how we define asymmetry, it combines two closely related “principles of war”: advantage and surprise (which itself is one of the ways to achieve advantage). Furthermore, asymmetry (advantage) refers both to material (physical) and nonmaterial (psychological, intellectual, inventive) aspects, with more weight on the latter. Applying it to the new security environment after the Cold War does not bring any positive contribution to the field of security studies.

The biggest challenge, in regard to all threats as indicators of security, will be the creation of an effective methodology for sorting threats into particular sectors: because many threats fit more than one sector, what is the delineation between sectors is not clear. For example, even weapons of mass destruction, if considered to be an asymmetric threat, relates to at least four sectors. First is the military sector, as they are military devices operated by military personnel. Second, they fall into the political sector as a means of deterrence not necessarily to be used, at least on a large scale. Third, they affect the environmental sector by posing an enormous threat to the natural environment and all human beings. Fourth, WMD can be said to refer to the technological sector, as they are an invention that at the same time threatens technological development.

⁵⁰ The issue of “weakness” in regard to asymmetry, although not only to asymmetry, is very subjective.

Such a categorization demands the establishment of clear relations between the three key scientific disciplines: security studies itself, the social sciences, and international relations. Currently, security studies is a subfield of international relations, although sometimes it is also treated as part of the social sciences. If analysis of a broad range of threats is to be effective, however, security studies should be prioritized. In other words, the division of threats should serve as a starting point. In this case, international relations and social sciences would become areas within a broad security studies field, with responsibility for analyzing different threats within their area of interest and responsibility. Such a scenario would be unacceptable for most researchers, but perhaps in the future this kind of reorganization will make sense. While, theoretically, such a solution would enable threats to be sorted into their proper sectors more effectively, from a practical point of view, it would require the agreement of scientists from all the affected fields, and this is far less probable, at least for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, such a segregation of threats would require policymakers to accept the results, as they are responsible for decision-making. Science, however, is not always in accordance with political practice; rather, political practice has fostered an approach based on the idea of asymmetry that does not fit a scientific scheme. It is not easy even to locate those threats within existing security sectors and levels. This does not, however, change the fact that at least some of those threats still exist, whether we want them to or not.

Considering complex nature of security we have to take into account not only a definition, but we have to analyze the content of security, as definition turned out not to be useful much, not to say useless. The next chapter analyses substance of security in terms of its dimensions, i.e. sectors and levels of analysis.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. SECURITY IN DIMENSIONS

As a result of the end of the Cold War and related changes in perceptions of the security environment, a major debate has been launched over narrow versus broad definitions of security.⁵¹ So many approaches and security paradigms arose within this debate that they did much to obscure the field of security studies. Security accumulated so many adjectives, such as national, international, global, environmental, human and many others, that it was necessary to clarify the meaning of security within their contexts, and to more strictly organize the field of security studies. Some current paradigms refer to aspects of security different from the one they should be addressing from a semantic point of view, e.g. national security refers to a state, not to a nation. Similarly, international security in practice refers to relations between states, not between nations. The meaning of the word “international” itself ranges from bilateral to global relations, and as such is neither a level nor a sector of security studies, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Some paradigms simply overlap to include the same issues, e.g., human and environmental.

Researchers, however, do not seem to pay attention to the above concerns. Some of the scholars who are taking part in this debate mix levels of analysis with sectors, putting everything in one box, trying to substantiate another sub-discipline - *human security*, and in turn, creating the next neologism in the long line of those that already exist.⁵² Others devote their attention to the establishment of structural links between security studies and international relations on a traditional basis, instead of concentrating on the changing security environment and on the clarification of relations within security studies as a discipline, regardless of its structural interface with international relations.⁵³

⁵¹ Although “narrow vs. broad” is often used in the context to definition, in reality it refers to the content of security as a field. Definition is a definition only, and its role is to explain the meaning of the term.

⁵² Ronald Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” *International Security* 26 (Fall 2001), pp. 87.

⁵³ Helga Haftendorn, although she lists almost everything that according to her should be studied within *international* security (narrowing security studies at large to international aspects), proposes to subordinate it to international relations discipline which seems to be narrower looking at the list.

“Asymmetric threats” are one example of threats that are not associated with their own field as a sub-discipline in security studies, unlike other threats grouped within sectors. There is no such sector as “asymmetric security,” at least not yet. Newly perceived threats, such as “information threats” or “terrorism,” could easily have their own sectors of analysis: information might fall into the broader “technological sector,” and in the case of the latter, “terrorism” constitutes a distinct subfield. Such a clarification is made possible by an analysis of the character of particular threats as measures of insecurity, even if it is difficult to place those threats into proper sectors or levels. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, however, this kind of analysis will require an effort by researchers from different disciplines, something not easy to achieve.

Although security studies has generally been centered in political science, it also has always been an interdisciplinary enterprise. The field of security studies nevertheless is highly compartmentalized, and ranges from peace research to strategic studies. This reflects the absence of a common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualized, and what the most relevant questions about it are.⁵⁴ Some researchers follow the idealist or liberal approach, using a broad selection of methods that range from normative paradigms and behavioral approaches to critical theories. Others use the Hobbesian national security paradigm, and in their normative orientation are committed to the goal of ensuring the military capacity to succeed in wars, devoting scant attention to the political, economic, and cultural aspects of security.⁵⁵

Helga Haftendorn recognizes the need for clarification in the security studies field. She concludes, however, that the concept of *international* security is still the most relevant. Within this approach she would include the following:

- theory and history of peace, war, and conflict;
- values, cultural heritage, and threat perception;
- concept of regional, international, and global security;
- security regimes and institution building;
- economic, natural resource, and ecological dimensions of security;
- challenges of terrorism and drug trafficking;

⁵⁴ Helga Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security,” *International Studies Quarterly* (1991) 35, pp. 15.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.15.

- impact of technology and information dissemination on international conflict;
- decision-making in crisis situations;
- defense policies of states and their domestic foundation; and
- nuclear strategy, weapons systems, arms control, and disarmament.⁵⁶

Although she uses the term *international*, which in a terminological sense narrows the subject to one uncertain level of analysis, she recommends the inclusion of almost all aspects within the broadly understood arena of security studies.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Haftendorn does not recommend any division of security studies into areas, or sub-disciplines, within its broad meaning.

Although there were many of approaches to the changed environment of security studies, the first convincing and comprehensive approach was proposed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde.⁵⁸ Whether we name it the debate on “deepening and broadening” or “widening versus narrowing,” this approach comprehensively delineates both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of security studies, in terms of levels and sectors of analysis. Although the levels these authors use are directly borrowed from the field of international relations, and their matrix of security studies is not complete (it was created before the concept of “asymmetric threats” became *au courant*), it opened the debate on the content of security studies.

As a result of dissatisfaction with the narrowing of the field of security studies that resulted from the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War; the rise of economic, societal, and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and 1980s; and later the rise of identity theft and transnational crime during the 1990s, the authors analyze the agenda of security studies, taking into account both inclusive and traditionalist approaches.

There is no consensus among scholars about which aspects of security studies these efforts to “deepen and broaden” should be applied to, though it is an important issue

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 15.

⁵⁷ The meaning “international” is uncertain both in terms of levels as it ranges from bilateral even to global, and in terms of sectors as it is not a sector although originally it could be perceived so.

⁵⁸ See Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998. See also Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, second ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado, 1991.

from both the scientific and political points of view. First, they allow a better understanding of the nature of security in general, and permit social scientists to define particular levels and areas of the discipline. Second, such a more inclusive understanding would allow decision-makers to implement better and more efficient security structures. Another benefit will be the improved education of personnel who deal with security within the state (national security), above the state level (regional security), and from a global perspective (environmental and human security), so they will be better equipped to deal with future security challenges.⁵⁹

This thesis presents three matrices that define three different approaches to security studies.⁶⁰ First is the “traditional” approach that existed before and during the Cold War; second is the “postmodern” approach that characterized the period after the end of the Cold War; and third is the “rational” approach recommended by the author of this thesis as a modification to the framework proposed by Buzan et al. Although the thesis builds on the levels of analysis adapted from the field of international relations and presented by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, its approach differs in terms of both the levels and number of sectors it defines. It also distinguishes descriptive and prescriptive forms of security studies.

The matrix presented in Figure 1 refers to the traditional approach, a result of perceptions of military and political threats to national security (security of the state).

Figure 1. Correlations Between Sectors And Levels (Traditional Approach).

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS	AREAS (SECTORS) OF SECURITY	
	POLITICAL	MILITARY
GLOBAL	Md	Md
REGIONAL	Mn	Mn
NATIONAL	D	D

D - dominant correlation; Md - moderate correlation; Mn - minor correlation.

⁵⁹ Human security, currently proposed by e.g. Sabina Alkire, (fn. 10), should not be considered as a sector as its issues are included in other sectors.

⁶⁰ See Figure 1, 2, and 3.

Figure 2 presents the approach taken by security researchers after the end of the Cold War, when economic and environmental aspects of security appeared on the security studies agenda. From this point, scholars began to refer not only to state security but also to the regional situation, reflecting the new political order brought about by the end of the bipolar system.

Figure 2. Correlations Between Sectors And Levels (Postmodern Approach).

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS	AREAS (SECTORS) OF SECURITY					
	POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	ENVIRONMENTAL	SOCIETAL	HUMAN
GLOBAL	Mn	N	Mn	D	N	Mn
INTERNATIONAL	Mn	N	Mn	Mn	N	N
REGIONAL	Md	Md	Md	Mn	N	N
NATIONAL	D	D	D	D	D	N
INDIVIDUAL	N	N	N	N	D	Md

D - dominant correlation; Md - moderate correlation; Mn - minor correlation; N - no correlation.

Figure 3 presents the author's approach to the field of security studies at the beginning of the new millennium, including issues arising from the new paradigm of "asymmetry."

Figure 3. Correlations Between Sectors And Levels (Rational Approach).

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS	AREAS (SECTORS) OF SECURITY							
	POLITICAL	MILITARY	SOCIETAL	ECONOMIC	ENVIRONMENTAL	TECHNOLOGICAL	TERRORISM	...
GLOBAL	Mn	N	N	N	D	D	D	?
...	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
REGIONAL	Md	Md	Mn	Mn	Md	Md	Md	?
...	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?
STATE	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	?
INDIVIDUAL	N	N	D	N	N	N	N	?

D - dominant correlation; Md - moderate correlation; Mn - minor correlation; N - no correlation.

Such an approach invites further discussion on the degree to which particular threats (sectors of security) exist on a particular level, and which asymmetric threats deserve to be treated as new sectors. Finally, this approach illustrates the openness of the field in terms of both new sectors and levels of analysis.

The levels of correlation, varying from “no correlation” to “dominant correlation,” symbolically reflect the importance (i.e., existence) of particular sectors at particular levels of analysis.

A. SECURITY PERCEPTION IN TERMS OF AREAS (SECTORS)

Thinking about security in term of sectors within the field of international relations developed somewhat haphazardly during the last decades of the Cold War, as scholars and practitioners added new issues to the military-political agenda. The practice of resorting to sectors, however, although common, is seldom made explicit.⁶¹ For realists from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz, sectors are important from an analytical point of view. Indeed, the entire discipline of social sciences in particular, but by no means uniquely, is based largely on a preference for thinking in terms of sectors. This practice assumes that economics, society, and politics can somehow be separated without problems.⁶² To explain such an approach within a wider security agenda, it will be necessary to clarify what sectors which (also could be called areas) mean in this context.

One way of looking at sectors is to see them as identifying specific types of interaction. In this way, the political sector refers to authority and governing status; the military sector refers to relationships of forceful coercion; the economic sector refers to production, trade, and finance; the societal sector refers to collective identity; and the environmental sector refers to relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.⁶³ Lastly, due to the rapid evolution of technology, especially in computers, another sector of security emerges. This is technological sector, which includes information issues. Human security, although it is discussed in this research, is not presented as a sector in the prescriptive matrix of security studies; rather, it is analyzed in order to show its inconsistency and lack of rationality from a scientific perspective, as was suggested in the previous section.

Looking at threats as indicators of security and sorting them to sectors reflecting their character has three particularly important advantages. First, it describes the whole

⁶¹ See Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998. See also Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, second ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado, 1991.

⁶² Ibid., pp.7.

⁶³ Ibid., pp.7.

security environment. Second, grouping threats on the basis of their character brings some organization to the increasingly complex field of security studies, and facilitates an understanding of how they manifest at particular levels of analysis. Third, it leaves space for new sectors to be identified and new threats to be located within existing sectors depending on the character of threat.⁶⁴

The thesis considers the following sectors within the current agenda of security studies.

1. Political Security

The political sector of security studies is the most difficult to deal with, as it is controversial in terms of its relation to other sectors. The meaning of the term *political security* is broad and it may include social, military, and environmental aspects, not to mention all other sectors. It is not only the widest sector, but also a residual category. In some sense, all security is political. All threats and defenses are constituted and defined politically. Societal security, as a responsibility of the governing authority, is part of the broader category of political security. This is even more controversial in the case of military security.⁶⁵ Another difficulty results from the close mutual relationship between the political and economic sectors. One influences the other to such a high degree that it is difficult to distinguish them. Environmental security can also be considered a political issue, although there is no common world policy or authority for environmental issues at the global level. Therefore, political security theoretically can be treated as superior to all the other sectors mentioned above.

According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, political security concerns the organizational stability of the social order: state, system of government, and ideology, the last of which gives the other two legitimacy.⁶⁶ The core of the political sector is made

⁶⁴ It is very likely that in the future new sectors will appear as new threats will emerge, both independently and as a result of human activity.

⁶⁵ See part on Military Security.

⁶⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 7.

up of threats to state sovereignty. From this core, political security issues spread out in two directions: first, nonmilitary threats to political units other than states, and second, beyond political units to areas such as international society or international law.⁶⁷ In other words, political threats are made, first, against the internal legitimacy of the political unit, which relates to ideologies and other issues defining the state, and second, against the external position of the state and its external legitimacy.⁶⁸

Although political security carries an extremely broad meaning, it can always be considered as a particular – social, military, economic, environmental, or other aspects. This suggests that there is no such thing as a political threat *per se*, but on the other hand, paradoxically, everything is a political issue. Nonetheless, the political sector is regarded as separate from other sectors to distinguish all concerns related to authority (government). Apart from that, political security is distinct from politics in general as it is about threats to the legitimacy or recognition of either political units or essential patterns (structures, processes, or institutions) that are components of politics.⁶⁹

2. Military Security

The military sector of security constitutes the core of traditional security studies, although not everything in the military sector refers automatically to security. This sector is very closely related to the political sector, as the military is the ultimate resource when other tools fail, such as diplomacy, economic sanctions, or trade privileges, for example. According to Frederick the Great: “diplomacy without force is like a musician without an instrument.” Traditionally, armed forces have been a political tool to ensure security for the state from outside threats, although serious threats do not always come from outside the state.⁷⁰ It is no wonder that at the beginning of the new millennium, when environmental, economic, and asymmetric threats dominate the security arena, all states

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 8.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp.144.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 144.

⁷⁰ There are many examples of use of military force to settle order within the state e.g. Poland in 1981.

continue to maintain armed forces at a size they can afford, or bigger than they can afford. Such oversized forces, however, usually are used for roles that have much more to do with economic and political relations than military ones. Participation of Polish forces in peacekeeping operations (PKO) and in the second war against Iraq, for example, have nothing to do with existential threats to Poland, but a lot to do with the political aspects of Poland's international role.

In the military security sector, the state is still the most important, although not the only referent object, among all other security actors. This is not only because states possess greater military resources than other actors, but also because states have the legitimate right to use those forces both outside and inside their domain. Moreover, as the state is defined by the idea of sovereignty, it has the right to self-government over specified territories and populations (society). On the other hand, the territorial nature of the state underpins the traditional primacy of use of force because of its particular effectiveness as a way of controlling territory. Historically, the right to govern the state has been established by the capability to assert and defend that claim against armed challengers. The agenda of military security is, therefore, focused largely around the state, although other actors are also in play.⁷¹ Even if we take into account alliances as actors on a supra-state level, however, we can contend that states combine their forces to protect their own security or economic interests as part of a common effort, and still consider military security to function at the state level.

Military security issues arise primarily from the internal and external processes by which human communities establish and maintain governments. In practice, however, the military security agenda revolves around the ability of governments to maintain themselves against internal and external military threats, but also can involve the use of military power to defend the state or government from nonmilitary threats, such as migrants or rival ideologies.⁷²

⁷¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 49.

⁷² Ibid., pp.50.

Although the partial interchangeability of force and processes of government links the political and military aspects, the military security sector appears in the traditional, postmodern, and rational approaches.⁷³

While the military sector is important for any approach to security studies, the various points of view offer different interpretations as to the nature of threats, i.e., threats to national security come from other states' militaries; from the perspective of international security the main threat is instability and the security dilemma; and finally, at the global level, the threat is perceived to come from the power of the military establishment and the danger of nuclear war.

3. Economic Security

The whole idea of economic security is exceedingly controversial and politicized, and it is not easy to distinguish what should be thought of as economic security from both politicized economics and security spillover from the economic sector to other sectors.⁷⁴ As mentioned above, the political and economic aspects of security are so closely related that it can be difficult to distinguish one from the other.

The concept of economic security is located in the unresolved and highly political debates about international political economy, concerning the nature of the relationship between the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market.⁷⁵ The main disagreement in this debate is concerned with different views on whether states and societies or markets should have priority, and whether private economic actors have security claims of their own that must be weighted against the verdict of the market.

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde distinguish the following three approaches:⁷⁶

⁷³ See Matrix of Security Studies – Figure 1, 2, and 3.

⁷⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 95.

⁷⁵ Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2d ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, pp. 230.

⁷⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 95.

Mercantilists and Neomercantilists put politics first, seeing the state as both embodying the social and political purposes for which wealth is generated, and providing the security necessary for the operation of firms and markets. From this perspective, economic security is simply part of a wider priority given to state (national) security, and economic success tends to be seen as a “zero sum game.”

Liberals put economics first, arguing that the economy should be at the heart of the social fabric, and that the market should be left to operate as freely as possible without interference by the state. The role of the state is to provide legal and political/military security, and to support societal security in the areas in which the market fails to do so. From this perspective, the main objective of economic security is to develop rules that create mobility among national economies, although it can also be argued that liberalism is protecting the position of the capitalist elite. Apart from that, liberals value economic efficiency and take a positive-sum, joint gains view of economic relations. The liberal ideal is ultimately to dissolve the national economy with its exclusive currency and restrictions on factor movement, into a global economy with relatively few restraints on the movement of goods, capital, services, and people. The problem here, however, is how to maintain economic and political stability and how to handle the widening gap between the very rich and very poor that unrestricted markets tend to generate while simultaneously removing many powers and functions from the state.

Socialists fall in between the two, arguing that economics is at the heart of the entire social fabric, and that the state’s task is to tame economics toward the social and political goals of justice and equity. From this perspective, the security focus is toward the economically weak and against the strong.

David Baldwin refers to economic security as economic statecraft, defining it as “influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.”⁷⁷ Economic statecraft also can be seen to cover all

⁷⁷ David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, Princeton University, Princeton, 1985, pp. 13-14.

instances where international actors use economic instruments for political ends; therefore, it sometimes is referred to as economic warfare.⁷⁸

One of the major economic developments – and challenges – at the beginning of the third millennium C.E., is the emergence and intensification of a global market economy. There has been wide debate concerning the stability of this complex network of both competitive and collaborative relations, and the possible destabilization of the liberal international economic order that could result from the decline of the United States as a hegemonic leader.⁷⁹ This explains the concerns about how to maintain order and stability in a liberal international political economy, with the focus on hegemons,⁸⁰ regimes, and international institutions.⁸¹

Both economic and military security are widely accepted to be the pillars of political security. Over the long term, however, the economic aspect dominates the military aspect of security, as a stable economy allows a state to maintain substantive armed forces according to its needs, as, for example, the United States has done. By contrast, when its economy is weak and unstable, a state will try to ensure security by military means. This, however, is a short-term solution, as a weak economy will not support costly armed forces for long. A typical example of such a situation is the Russian Federation.

Economic security, therefore, should be placed near, if not at, the top of security priorities, especially at the state level. Of course, this does not mean that political or military security is not important at the state level– even an economically strong state has

⁷⁸ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin Books, 1998, pp. 146.

⁷⁹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 110.

⁸⁰ See Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression 1929-1939*, London: Allen Lane, 1973., and “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (1981), pp. 242-254., also Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy in International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

⁸¹ See Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

to be politically stable and militarily able to defend its interests. Economic stability, however, significantly increases all other sectors of security.

4. Societal Security

Societal security is also very closely related to, although distinct from, political security, and refers to the organizational stability of the state and system of government, and of the ideology that gives the state and the government legitimacy.

The key issue in security of a society is human identity. Society is about identity, the self-conception of communities, and the individuals who identify themselves as members of a community. Those identities are different from the explicitly political organizations concerned with government.⁸² Also from an international security perspective, the key to societal analysis is the ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Societal security is about the broad, self-sustaining identity of groups varying both over time and place.⁸³

Human identity is “highly selective, inscriptive rather than descriptive, serving particular interests and ideological positions,” and identity looks different from the individual rather than group (state) perspective.⁸⁴

Identity has become a salient scholarly and cultural construct in the mid-twentieth century, particularly among social scientists in the United States.⁸⁵ After the end of the Cold War, the problem of identity emerged with new salience. As a species, we are social beings who live out our lives in the company of other humans. What constitutes the identity, both of an individual and a group, is not easy to determine given differences in the way individuals are socialized during the course of their lives. We organize ourselves into various kinds of social groupings: as members of families, clans, neighborhoods,

⁸² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 119.

⁸³ See Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kalstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and New Security Order in Europe*, London: Pinter, 1993.

⁸⁴ B. Gills, "Myth, History and Political Identity" in *Cultural Anthropology*, May 1992: 193-209

⁸⁵ Anthony R. Bichel, Ph.D., *Identity/Difference in Central Asia*, ICARP – Publications, www.icarp.org

villages, cities, countries, professions, social interest groups or even transnational organizations, in which we work, trade, play, reproduce and interact in countless other ways. Identity is always a contested issue, as individuals who are assumed to share common values may be structured in hierarchical or functional ways. When people evoke identity, they are less concerned with the totality of social values than with a primary set of values that are assumed to transcend social divisions. Such core values are often based on religion, language, race, color or an assumed common culture. Consequently, the patterns of human society differ from place to place and era to era and across cultures, making the world a very complex and dynamic environment.⁸⁶

Recently, historians, psychologists and anthropologists have acknowledged the subjective nature of identity. Although the subject of identity is very complex in nature as it encompasses the totality of social experience, much of which is influenced by history, it can be a source of serious challenges.⁸⁷ Recent examples include the Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the European states that are considering the future shape of the European Union and states' identity within it.

A good example of the ways in which such complex identities influence security in the societal sector is Central Asian, which is not a homogeneous region whose population shares a common conception of human identity, but rather a highly diverse collection of people who live in vastly differing political, cultural, religious, and economic systems. Discussions about stability and “fault lines” along which grievances may find expression often focus solely on identities. Divisions between religious, ethnic, and regional groups, however, often are not clear. Instead, multiple and cross-cutting identities complicate the ability to sort out where the most serious schisms lie. In Central Asia, this issue is extremely complex. For example, ethnic Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan may view themselves as Kyrgyz vis-à-vis Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan, as southerners vis-à-vis people from northern Kyrgyzstan, as Muslims or Central Asians vis-à-vis Russians, and even as a particular clan or tribe distinct from other Kyrgyz.⁸⁸ Serious

⁸⁶ Human Society, <http://www.project.org/tools/benchol/ch7/ch7.htm>

⁸⁷ <http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/websitedocument.nsf>.

⁸⁸ *Calming the Ferghana Valley*, Center for Preventive Action, New York, 1999, pp. 99.

differences divide even small communities among themselves. These competing or complementary identities affect all relations and prospects for stability or peace in the region.

An example of such complex identities and their influence on Central Asian stability may be seen in the fertile, relatively wealthy Ferghana Valley, which is shared by three states: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Political Islam has been involved in past and recent conflicts in the Andijan and Namangan, and remains important mainly in Uzbekistan's part of the valley. In southern Kyrgyzstan, by contrast, people speak of ethnicity as the main dividing line, and some Kyrgyz depict Islamist activism as part of a greater Uzbek threat.⁸⁹ Ethnic questions involve not only policies like representation in the government and administration, but many other aspects of life from economic opportunities to religion. All Central Asian leaders are trying to stabilize their rule in the midst of socioeconomic crises, regional instability, and potential or actual religious quarrels. They invoke identities like regionalism, Islam, and ethnicity to mobilize people to deal with problems through either cooperation or conflict.⁹⁰

In Europe, social security is mainly about nations and nation-like ethnic groups – minorities and regions. Europe has strong regionalizing dynamics in the societal sector. The issues of minorities and nations are included in a constellation of multilayered identities, and integration and thereby security is determined largely by the fate of this constellation. However, the risk exists that some identities will be seen by others as so threatening that it will cause reactions which in turn will block European integration.⁹¹

Wæver puts emphasis on the distinction between the terms “social” and “societal,” as each of them refers to different aspects of identity. Social security, according to him, refers to individuals and the economic aspects of their life, whereas societal security refers to collectives and their identity. The most common issues

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 100.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 97.

⁹¹ See Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kalstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and New Security Order in Europe*, London: Pinter, 1993.

concerned with societal security are migration, horizontal competition, and vertical competition.⁹²

Migration. Migration as a threat to societal security is viewed as a possible change in the identity of a people due to a shift in the composition of the population, i.e., one group of people that has been overrun and diluted by the influence of newcomers will not be what they used to be, because these others will make up a portion of the population. As a result, the identity of the indigenous people will be changed (e.g., Polish migration to the United States).

Horizontal competition. People change their ways of thinking because of overriding cultural and linguistic influence from a neighboring culture (e.g., Canadian fears of Americanization).

Vertical competition. People will stop seeing themselves as one group because of the process of integration (e.g., the EU), or because of a secessionist “regionalist” process (e.g., Quebec, Catalonia, and Kurdistan).

Although analytically distinct, in practice these three types of threats to identity can easily be combined and placed on a broad spectrum ranging from intentional and programmatic to unintended and structural. Migration, for example, can, on the one hand, be based on individual decisions to move for different reasons varying from economic to environmental, or even religious, and on the other hand, be a part of a political program to “homogenize” the population of the state, as has been the case with the Sinification of Tibet since 1959, or the Russification of Central Asia and the Baltic States in the mid-twentieth century.⁹³

5. Environmental Security

As with the sectors described above, environmental security is very broad and complex, with issues that range from scarcities (e.g., of clean water, fuel, arable land) to

⁹² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 121.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 121.

the degradation of lands, forests, and fisheries, to the impacts of climate change, migration and population growth.⁹⁴ So far, epistemic communities, social movements, governmental departments, and international organizations all have emerged from the environmental discourse that has been manifest since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.⁹⁵

There are many different approaches to environmental security. Some experts treat it as “ultimate security,” others as a misguided linkage of separate issues, but most who study the problems are somewhere in-between.⁹⁶ Regardless of those different approaches, it seems that the most problematic issue of environmental security is the existence of two different agendas: scientific and political. Although they overlap and influence each other, the scientific agenda is typically embedded in the sciences and nongovernmental activities, and is constructed outside the core of politics. The political agenda has essentially a governmental and intergovernmental character. It consists of public decision-making processes and public policies that address how to deal with environmental concerns.⁹⁷ Apart from that, environmental issues are often perceived not to be security issues because they do not fall in the appropriate time frame, or the ability of government to respond is limited.⁹⁸ Therefore, the major research challenge is the establishment of a methodology that would allow researchers and decision-makers to assess the security relevance of environmental variables.⁹⁹

Environmental factors also cannot be considered in isolation from geographic, historical, socioeconomic and cultural variables. Therefore, the widest formulation of the

⁹⁴ Paul J. Runci, *Security and Environment: An Annotated Bibliography*, www.pln.gov

⁹⁵ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 71.

⁹⁶ See Norman Myers, *Ultimate Security – The Environmental Bases of Political Stability*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1993; and Daniel Deudney, *The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security*, *Millennium* 19:3, 1990, pp. 461-496.

⁹⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 72.

⁹⁸ See Brian R. Shaw, “When are Environmental Issues Security Issues?,” *Environmental Change and Security Project*, The Woodrow Wilson Center, Spring 1996.

⁹⁹ Paul J. Runci, *Security and Environment: An Annotated Bibliography*, www.pln.gov

environmental agenda includes many issues that are a subject of studies within other sectors. This broad sector includes a number of intractable problems:

Disruption of ecosystems: climate change; loss of biodiversity; deforestation, desertification, and other forms of erosion; depletion of the ozone layer; and various forms of pollution.

Energy: the depletion of natural resources such as fuel wood; various forms of pollution, including management disasters (in particular related to nuclear energy, oil transportation, and chemical industries); and scarcities and uneven distribution of resources.

Population: population growth and consumption exceeding the earth's carrying capacity; epidemics and poor health conditions in general; declining literacy rates; politically and socially uncontrollable migrations, including unmanageable urbanization.

Food: poverty, famines, over-consumption and diseases related to these extremes; loss of fertile soils and water resources; epidemics and poor health conditions in general; and scarcities and uneven distribution of resources.

Economic disparities: protection of unsustainable production modes; societal instability inherent in the growth imperative, leading to cyclical and hegemonic breakdowns; and structural asymmetries and inequity.

Civil strife: war and conflict-triggered environmental damage and degradation.¹⁰⁰

Looking at this list, it is not clear, however, how the environmental sector should be defined to deal with all these problems. While the distribution of ecosystems is the most purely environmental issue area, the other issues refer, to a high degree, to other sectors of security studies. Nevertheless, environmental security should not be limited to ecosystems. Regardless of the fact that some issues refer to other sectors, this area should include all aspects concerned with the environment, including Earth's atmosphere.

¹⁰⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 74.

6. Human Security

Human security, although it has emerged as a separate security area, is not included in the matrix of security studies being proposed here, as it does not bring any positive contribution in terms of clarification of the already complex security environment. Instead it mixes various sectors, and even sectors with levels, putting almost everything into one box.

“Human security is the latest in a long line of neologisms including common security, collective security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security, which encourage policymakers and scholars to think about international security as something more than the military defense of state interests and territory.”¹⁰¹ Although human security represents a new paradigm for scholars and practitioners alike, it still remains unclear whether the concept of human security can serve as a practical guide for academic research or governmental policymaking, as it is so vague that virtually any kind of unexpected or irregular discomfort could conceivably constitute a threat to one's human security. However, Roland Paris says that human security is powerful precisely because it lacks precision and thereby encompasses the diverse perspectives and objectives of all the members of the coalition that promotes it.¹⁰²

According to Paris, who bases this argument on the work of Daniel Deudney, human security has two essential limitations in terms of its usefulness from both the academic and practical points of view. First, the concept lacks a precise definition. Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals, and academics with little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied. Second, the most ardent backers of human security have an interest in keeping the term expansive and vague. The idea of human security is the glue that holds together a jumbled coalition of "middle power" states, development agencies, and NGOs, shifting attention and resources away

¹⁰¹ Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (Fall 2001), pp 87.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 88.

from conventional security issues and toward goals that have traditionally fallen under the rubric of international development.¹⁰³

The first major statement concerning human security appeared in the 1994 Human Development Report, an annual publication of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The intention was to broaden the existing security agenda, including “legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily life, and their protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.”¹⁰⁴ Even within this “human security coalition,” however, the advocates differ as to what exactly human security should encompass.

The authors of the UNDP report identify seven specific elements that comprise human security: economic security (freedom from poverty); food security (access to nutritious food); health security (access to health care and protection from diseases); environmental security (protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and depletion); personal security (physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents); community security (survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical security of these groups); and political security (enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression).¹⁰⁵ Other scholars have developed other lists and definitions, encompassing issues ranging from loving relationships to emancipation from oppression.¹⁰⁶

If human security is all these things, Paris asks, what is not?¹⁰⁷ According to Gary King and Christopher Murray:

¹⁰³ See Daniel Deudney, *Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking*, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 3, (April 1991).

¹⁰⁴ United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report*, 1994, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 22-23.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.24.

¹⁰⁶ See Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability*, pp. 25., Laura Reed and Majid Tehranian, *Evolving Security Regimes, Worlds Apart*, pp. 39-47., Caroline Thomas, *Globalization, Human Security*, and African Experience, pp.3., also Robert Bedeski, *Human Security, Knowledge, and the Evolution of the Northeast Asian State*, Center for Global Studies, University of Victoria, February 8, 2000, <http://www.globalcentres.org>

¹⁰⁷ Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (Fall 2001), pp 92.

defining the core values of human security may be difficult not only because there is so little agreement on the meaning of human security, but because the term's ambiguity serves a particular purpose. It unites a diverse and sometimes fractious coalition of states and organizations that see an opportunity to capture some of the more substantial political interest and superior financial resources associated with more traditional, military conceptions of security.¹⁰⁸

Although human security is included in Matrix 2 as a descriptive factor, it has no place in a prescriptive approach to security studies (Matrix 3). It does not seem to be a rational approach, but rather a discussion forum, or simply an area of interest for some people or groups of people. It does not mean, of course, that some of the issues currently considered under this paradigm are not important, such as human rights, poverty, hunger, and disease, but they equally could be included in the societal sector, and dealt with at different levels including levels above the state. These issues do not require a new paradigm.

7. Technological Security

Technological issues are still not considered to be security challenges. Rapid technological development, however, is creating conditions such that in the near future technology will play a crucial, if not paramount, role in the broadly understood security environment. Currently, information has emerged as a security issue influencing all aspects of human life, and information technology is considered a possible asymmetric threat. Despite the current obsession with it, information always was of crucial value, when no one even imagined asymmetry as a security approach. Nevertheless, although information is the best “security weapon” by nature, its significance rises together with the rapid development of technology, in terms of both processing and collecting (computers), and dissemination (media).

The information warfare (IW) concept has a much broader context than only military. But the main approach of asymmetric warfare refers to the modern U.S. military's concept of fighting, which requires the rapid, efficient exchange of vast

¹⁰⁸ Gary King and Christopher Murray, *Rethinking Human Security*, Harvard University, May 4 2000, <http://www.gking.harvard.edu/files/hs.pdf>

amounts of information.¹⁰⁹ It mirrors the cultural and business explosion of information exchange unleashed in the last twenty years by the power of the personal computer and the worldwide web. This global system supports not only the financial well-being of the United States, but also the operation of an increasing proportion of the physical infrastructure necessary for day-to-day life in the United States, from air traffic control to hydroelectric plant management. Allied with this is the growth of a global culture that fosters the rapid exchange of information on a bewildering variety of subjects. This is the environment, ripe with both promise and danger, for information operations.¹¹⁰

Jonathan Tucker argues that information warfare could be used to disable computer networks, paralyzing communications, transportation, power systems, and industrial enterprises. Public-relations warfare might allow opponents to exploit the international news media to weaken the resolve of U.S. decision makers. Adversaries or terrorists might employ software commands or malicious programs to shut down or disable key military computer systems. The fact that young hackers have been able to break into the U.S. Navy and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) computers suggests that determined cyber-warriors from a hostile nation or a well-financed terrorist group might inflict considerably more damage. Programmable weapon systems may also be vulnerable to attacks by self-replicating computer viruses that erase stored data.¹¹¹ Asymmetric warfare is and will continue to be a way for adversaries to gain an advantage over the United States. Nations, non-state groups, and even individuals will be able to use means of asymmetric warfare to their advantage over the only military superpower on Earth.¹¹²

Although information warfare, as defined by its proponents, refers mainly to military aspects on the battlefield, in reality it also refers to nonmilitary aspects. According to Winn Schwartau, information warfare is a prominent type of asymmetric

¹⁰⁹ Henry, H. Shelton, *Information Operations: A Strategy for Peace, The Decisive Edge in War*, Washington DC.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1999.

¹¹⁰ Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., "The Revenge of The Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR," *McNair Paper* 62, pp. 2, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/macnair62/html>

¹¹¹ Jonathan B. Tucker, *Asymmetric Warfare*, <http://forum.ra.utk.edu/1999summer/asymmetric.htm>

¹¹² Robert H. Allen, *Asymmetric Warfare: Is the Army Ready?*, <http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil>

strategy that is likely to emerge in the near future, and it can be waged at three different levels of intensity.¹¹³

First, information warfare comprises industrial and economic espionage by both state and non-state actors. Thus, British Airways stole customers from Virgin Atlantic through simple theft of a database. Techniques can be different, e.g., eavesdropping on telephone conversations (including cell phones), internet sniffing, password cracking, and electronic breaking and entering. For example, the United States loses \$300 billion per year as a result of industrial and economic espionage conducted on line. According to the FBI, some 122 countries conduct such espionage.

Second, information warfare can be, and often is, conducted between states as cyber terrorism. China's declaration of "unrestricted war," and Russia's announcement that IW is second in seriousness only to nuclear war, fit this category.¹¹⁴ The cyber-terrorist threat also extends into the civilian sector. As the most computerized country in the world, the United States relies on a vast number of networked processors and databanks for the operation of its critical infrastructure – the system of interdependent industries and institutions that provide a continual flow of goods and services essential to the nation's security and welfare.¹¹⁵

In light of these factors, to have information warfare refer to its military aspects only would be a significant limitation to research, as the concept intentionally emanates from many views. Information has become, if it was not always, the most valuable good. This sector might include analysis on possible threats from technology in both the military (weapons) and civil (industry) sectors of life, as well as threats posed by new scientific developments such as genetic engineering and nano-technology, among others.

¹¹³ Winn Schwartz, *Fundamentals of Information Warfare, Asymmetrical Adversaries*, 2001, www.findarticles.com

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *National Security Division, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, Terrorism in the United States 1996*, <http://www.fbi.gov/publish/terror/terroris.pdf>

8. Terrorism

Terrorism is often perceived as a political threat, because –according to traditionalist perceptions – terrorists usually harbor political goals, and also as an asymmetric threat of uncertain nature resulting from the use of unconventional kinds of violence. In this research, however, terrorism is considered separately, since political goals can be highly subjective. Although it might have been possible in the past, nowadays it is impossible to distinguish which terrorist act arises from political, religious, economic, or even psychological motivations.

Before engaging in an analysis of terrorism, however, one has to understand its real nature. There are many different, often contradictory, approaches to this question, and the field's specialists have not formulated any comprehensive and widely accepted definition.¹¹⁶ Therefore, it makes sense to begin this analysis with a definition of this venerable phenomenon, and then to analyze it as a threat.

The term “terrorism” dates from the Reign of Terror (1793–94) that followed the French Revolution, although the term has taken on additional connotations in the 20th century.¹¹⁷ The semantic meaning of the word “terror” comes from the French *terreur* - “great fear,” or further, from the Latin *terror* - “great fear, dread,” (verb *terrere* – to fill with fear, frighten).¹¹⁸

Maria Jose Moyano, trying to combine a few definitions, describes rather than defines terrorism as “the use or threat of use of violence to achieve political objectives, when such violence is intended to control a population through fear or coerce a government into granting certain concessions.”¹¹⁹ Although she distinguishes the threat of use of violence from the actual use of violence, she does not explain in what way the threat of violence is a terrorist act. Is each blackmail automatically an act of terrorism? If not, how does one distinguish these acts from one another? She also puts emphasis on

¹¹⁶ Maria J. Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol, Armed Struggle, 1969-1979*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1995, pp. 3.

¹¹⁷ The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001, <http://www.bartleby.com/65/te/terroris.html>

¹¹⁸ Etymology, <http://www.etymonline.com/t3etym.htm>

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 3.

“intention to control a population.” The term control, however, is an exaggeration. Terrorists want to threaten a sufficient number of people, and by doing so coerce a government (though not only governments) to meet their requirements; or to punish some politicians; or simply to draw attention to themselves.

Similarly, Walter Laqueur defines terrorism as “the substate application of violence or threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the incumbents, and to bring about political change.”¹²⁰ But what about state-sponsored terrorism? Moreover, states themselves commit terrorist acts, for example, use of fear by Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia or by Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

These descriptions are true up to a point, but they do not define terrorism in terms of its nature. They simply list the features of this phenomenon and try to find the relationships between those features. In spite of the lack of a comprehensive and widely accepted definition, there is an agreement in regard to three features of terrorism. First, the most obvious feature is the use of violence. There are so many kinds of violence all over the world, however, that defining terrorism simply by its violent methods seems to be insufficient. Violence takes place almost everywhere and very often, so a way to distinguish terrorism from this more general violence is needed.

The second feature, according to many experts, that distinguishes terrorism from other acts of violence, is its political aspect, i.e., the political goals that lie behind all terrorist acts. In practice, however, it is almost impossible to unequivocally state that a particular terrorist act has a *strict* political goal, or even background. For example, killing a policymaker in his car, or blowing up his house, does not automatically mean that there was a political goal behind the act. It could be criminal, related to money, or even revenge concerned with his private relations. While terrorists usually claim their acts, September 11, 2001 showed that this is not always the case, either. If no one claims responsibility, who can state that the goal without question was just political? Moreover, how can one explain millenarian or nihilistic acts of violence committed by a doomsday

¹²⁰ Walter Laqueur, *Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game*, Foreign Affairs, September-October, 1996, pp. 24.

cult? Such groups might have nothing to do with politics, at least in its standard meaning, but they can commit, unquestionably, terrorist acts.

The third feature of terrorism, which is more useful for identifying terrorism than the two mentioned above, is that it is directed at innocent people. But again, in terrorists' view the people targeted are not necessarily innocent, because they support the government, or military, or other non-political target entity.

The main problem for researchers, related to terrorism, is the fact that it is extremely difficult to distinguish it from other related kinds of violence such as organized crime, guerrilla warfare, and especially fights for freedom against oppression. A question arises here: why should we try to distinguish terrorism from other kinds of violence? Although it seems justifiable to distinguish terror from the fight for freedom, especially in totalitarian systems, there is no need to distinguish it from guerrilla warfare or organized crime. Criminals, regardless of their goals and motivations, should have to comply with the same rules of law as everyone else. And with regard even to freedom fighters, the question arises: who should decide whether their use of violence is justified or not? All of these are just examples of asymmetry.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been known for decades, centuries, or even millennia. Terrorism has gained increasing attention since the mid-1970s, as the world got used to it – over a relatively short time – as a method of gaining “political” goals used by such groups as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Red Brigades, and many, many other groups. September 11, however, represented a turning point, as the first time in history this “natural” method of coercion reached the homeland of the only superpower.

Paradoxically, although terrorism seems to be the most asymmetric threat of all, it is just a natural form of competition between a “stronger” and a “weaker” party, regardless of the time and place. Therefore, similarly to security, the problem is not in the definition, but rather in the understanding of the nature of terrorism, and what is much more important, of the political (and at the same time economic) interests of particular people or groups of people. Terrorism is nothing other than “a method of gaining goals.”

Both its apparent political aspect, and the degree to which it targets innocent people, are highly subjective, but this does not change the fact that it is a violent method, which should be punished regardless of the motives.

Taking all the above into account, terrorism should have its place within security studies, either in the political sector because of terrorism's traditional characterization as a political tool, or perhaps eventually in its own sector, since terrorism is likely to become one of the world's biggest security challenges thanks to new technologies. For the purpose of this research, terrorism possesses its own sector, despite its political notions. Moreover, as a method, terrorism is extremely difficult to defeat, if at all possible. Usually, the only way to deal with it is prevention. Therefore, the main effort in dealing with terrorism, should be put into intelligence as a political tool, enabling the state to prevent terrorist acts.

A. SECURITY PERCEPTION IN TERMS OF LEVELS

Levels of analysis help to structure a theory. They enable analysts to locate both the sources of explanation and the outcomes with which theories are concerned.¹²¹ While it is impossible to locate all actors, forums, and other elements at their proper levels, we can, up to a point, locate the most evident and significant factors from the security studies perspective, on the basis of levels. Therefore, this section refers to four levels as a vertical dimension of security studies: global, regional, state, and individual (personal). Although they refer, to some degree, to the levels utilized in International Relations (I.R.) studies, such as system, subsystem, unit, subunit, and individual, the four levels employed here refer to the objects of security, rather than to levels of analysis in I.R.

Particular levels are presented in three different matrices referring to the three different analytical approaches: traditional, postmodern, and rational.¹²²

¹²¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 6.

¹²² See Figure 1, 2, and 3.

1. Global Level

Global security embodies a program of common security for the global community of humans, as was proposed by the Palme Commission (an Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues). In its 1982 report, subtitled “Blueprint for Survival,” the Commission argued for replacing the strategy of mutual deterrence with one of *common security*, that rests on a commitment to joint survival and a program for arms control and disarmament. It further called for a transformation of the international system to make it capable of peaceful and orderly change, suitable for trade and travel, and conducive to intercultural exchanges of ideas and experience.¹²³

Global security refers to a system of world order. According to Helga Haftendorn, a global security system presupposes strong institutions (potentially a world government) to regulate interactions between units (states), and to enforce rules and norms.¹²⁴

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde name this level “*international systems*,” to designate the largest conglomerates of interacting or interdependent units, with no system level above them.¹²⁵ Because of the fact that there is no global government, or security institutions with global responsibility and the means to execute this responsibility, global security may actually refer only to the environmental security sector, and to human security, if at all, in the meaning of human beings as a species.

In the Kantian tradition, the paradigm of global security is a utopia – nonexistent but theoretically possible.¹²⁶ It is difficult not to agree with him. The United Nations (U.N.), for example, is without doubt an international – even global – security organization, with member states from all over the world, but even as such the U.N. is not efficient because of the dominance of national over collective security interests. The League of Nations was similarly constrained.¹²⁷

¹²³ Helga Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security,” *International Studies Quarterly* (1991) 35, pp. 11.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.12.

¹²⁵ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 5.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.11.

¹²⁷ Helga Haftendorn, “The security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security,” *International Studies Quarterly* (1991) 35, pp. 8.

It seems impossible to speak of global security as long as there is no global government or institutions capable of dealing effectively with security challenges at the global level. All current activities either are associations of people of good will, or simply institutions and organizations focused on their own, often hidden, interests. Still, this does not mean that there are no global problems or threats, even if there is no ready global response. Environmental threats are a good example of issues that will require global attention. States may remain the main actors in the world security arena, and the only likely solution to global problems will still be associations of people and organizations that possess the resources to deal with security challenges at levels above that of the state.

2. Regional Level

Although everyone thinks they know what a region is, regional security still requires a definition, as the meaning of the term is not so obvious in geographic and political terms as one might think. Geographically, regions have usually been associated with continents or parts of continents. From a political perspective, however, regions are much more difficult to define. Is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, regional or global? In geographic terms, NATO spans two continents and therefore technically is extra-regional. From the political point of view it is regional, because it is centered on the transatlantic “region,” but it also conducts activities in other regions than the north Atlantic (e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq). One could suggest that NATO lies somewhere between the regional and global levels, but it cannot be treated as a global entity because it is not responsible for global security. This example demonstrates why the regional level of security studies is one of the most difficult to define.

From a semantic point of view, on the one hand, regional security could be treated as part of “international security,” as the meaning of the term “international” can include all “nations” (for this purpose we can say “states”), making it “global.” On the other hand, international can as well refer to only two states. Therefore, taking this ambiguity into account, and also the origins and circumstances in which “international security” was introduced as a subfield of security studies (traditionally, it emphasized security concerns

related to nuclear weapons), it would be true to say that this is neither a level (as it ranges from bilateral to global in scope), nor a sector.¹²⁸

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde name this regional level “*international subsystems*:” groups of units (states) within the international system, that can be distinguished from the entire system by the particular nature or intensity of their interactions with or interdependence on each other. According to this definition, subsystems can be territorially coherent (thus regional, e.g., the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN), or simply subsystems (the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD, or Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries – OPEC).¹²⁹ This approach comes directly from international relations theory, however, and is not readily applied to security studies, as each international institution would require separate categorization because of different security requirements and capabilities. Apart from that, not all organizations mentioned by the authors are security organizations. OPEC and OECD, for instance are political and economic, and have little to do with security.

Although it is difficult to define “region” both in political and geographical terms, this level enables us to deal with the new political order that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. In addition, this level is in accordance with the subsystem level defined by I.R. studies. It is possible that in the future new levels will be created both above and below the regional level, to clarify at which level some international institutions and organizations operate, such as the U.N., NATO, or the three-state Weimar Triangle (Germany, France, and Poland). Many international organizations are not necessarily regional, but it is difficult to say which of them exists above the level of states, as the term “international” can also mean “between states” – at the same level as a state.

Without a comprehensive definition of “region” it remains difficult to define regional security. This level has received greater attention since the collapse of the

¹²⁸ The concept of international security is based on a mutual interest in survival under conditions of nuclear deterrence and on recognition that adversary will be deterred from attacking out of its own self-interest. See Helga Haftendorn, *The security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security*, *International Studies Quarterly* (1991) 35, pp. 9.

¹²⁹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 6.

bipolar world system, however, and its importance continues to increase. The term regional security is much more precise than “international,” and fits well between the state and global levels.

3. State Level

The paradigm of national security emerged in a specific historical setting, together with the birth of the nation-state in the seventeenth century. The interest in national survival caused national security to become a prominent concern.

According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, nations represent the *unit* level of analysis. By unit they mean actors composed of various subgroups, organizations, communities, and many individuals that are sufficiently cohesive and independent to be differentiated from others and to have standing at the higher levels (e.g. states, nations, transnational firms).¹³⁰ They do not, however, clarify the difference between an organization at this level and organizations at the regional (international) level. Moreover, lumping transnational firms together with various subgroups from the unit level does not seem to be justified, as one group adheres to a different set of rules and laws than the other. To make it even more complicated, the same authors specify another closely related level – “*subunits*, in the meaning of organized groups of individuals within units that are able (or that try) to affect the behavior of the unit (e.g., bureaucracies, lobbies).”¹³¹ This specification completely obscures the meaning of the state level of analysis.

The relationship between “nation” and “state” is crucial in the context of competing perspectives on security. Although traditionally *national security* refers directly to the *security of the state*, and very often the terms state and nation are used interchangeably, from a semantic point of view they refer to quite different ideas. *National security*, the *security of the state*, and the recently introduced concept of *homeland security* all refer to the same level – the state level.

¹³⁰ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 6.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp.6.

a. National Security

The term national security, traditionally related to the military and semantically related to the nation, either should change or disappear from the security vocabulary. This is because “nation” is defined as a group that is part of the society within a state, and there might be more than one nationality making up society.¹³² Therefore, applying national security to the state is illogical, as the meaning of the term “state” is much broader than “nation” only.

The word “nation” itself derives from the Latin verb *nasci* – to be born.¹³³ The modern meaning of nation, reflected by the concept of nationalism, arose in the 18th century.¹³⁴ Contemporary historian Walter Bagehot presented the history of the 19th century as that of “nation-building.”¹³⁵ Attempts to establish objective criteria for nationhood, or to explain why certain groups have become “nations” and others not, have often been based on a single criterion such as language or ethnicity, or a combination of criteria such as language, common territory, common history and identity, cultural traits, ethnic and racial origins, religion, common economic life, or even a political base.¹³⁶

There is no consensus among the field’s experts as to what exactly a nation is. Eric Hobsbawm defines nation as “a social entity only insofar as it related to a certain kind of modern territorial state – the nation-state,” and goes on to say that “nation” belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent period.¹³⁷ He says that nations are dual phenomena constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people.¹³⁸ However, in practice, it is extremely difficult to distinguish the national aspect from the ethnic one.

¹³² Currently there are there are 191 states and around 7,000 - 10, 000 nations all over the world.

¹³³ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin Books, 1998, pp. 342.

¹³⁴ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870. Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 3.

¹³⁵ Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, London 1887, pp. 20-21.

¹³⁶ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin Books, 1998, pp. 342.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 9.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 10.

The term “ethnicity” was coined by Lloyd Warner in 1941. It is a derivative of the Greek word *ethnicos*, which originally meant “heathen” or “cultural strangers.”¹³⁹ Ethnicity is a form of socially constructed identity concerned with territory (place of birth and living, close relations with family and neighbors, culture, etc.).¹⁴⁰ Nationality seems to be a politically created phenomenon, however, based on one or more ethnic groups. Viewed this way, it is true that nationality is constructed from above (by policy-makers); approaching it from an ethnic perspective, however, it seems that the key factor is human self-determination and identification with an ethnic group. Even within one nation, there often is antagonism between particular ethnic groups, e.g., people from the mountains discriminate against people from the coast, or other kinds of conflicts, such as between different classes, or related to national minorities within the state. Therefore, it is misleading to refer to national security. But again, what is nationality? In the United States, all U.S. citizens possess U.S. nationality; most Europeans, however, regardless of their citizenship, possess nationality from the state where they were born. A person born in Poland, for example, no matter in which country he or she lives, remains Polish.

Another related term, “nationalism,” is often considered from different perspectives: as an ideology, a movement, and even a doctrine.¹⁴¹ Most commonly, however, nationalism is regarded as an ideology and, therefore, above all a moral or normative principle, a belief about how the world is and should be organized. The spread of nationalism is a result of the transformation of the international system over the past two centuries. It has no clear founding theorist, no classical text to which others can refer or argue about. It is what philosophers sometimes call a “cluster-concept,” i.e., an idea usually with several elements attached. Nationalism is above all a moral principle, which claims that nations do exist, that they should coincide with (i.e. encompass the same

¹³⁹ Anthony R. Bichel, *Identity/Difference in Central Asia*, 1997, <http://www.icarp.org/publications.html>

¹⁴⁰ It is worth of emphasizing that there are more than a hundred of definitions of the term “culture”, and there is no consensus between scientists in regard to the meaning of this word.

¹⁴¹ See Fred Halliday, Nationalism, in: *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. by John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 359-373.

people as) political communities, and that they should be self-ruling.¹⁴² According to Ernest Gellner, nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national should be congruent.¹⁴³ But here an explanation of the political aspect is necessary, as it can refer to much more than just security. Politics is the relatively stable institutionalization of authority,¹⁴⁴ shaping human behavior for the purpose of governing large groups of people.¹⁴⁵ Hence, the concept of “national” security can only have meaning in relation to some political entity. The political entity most often considered, however, is the “state.”

b. Security of the State

To start with, there is no comprehensive or widely accepted definition of the term “state.” Most dictionaries, books and even official documents list the attributes of the state, rather than define it. According to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, which is widely regarded as the classic legal “definition,” “states must possess the following qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory and a government capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and of conducting international relations with other states.”¹⁴⁶

One of the leading experts in the field of politics, Max Weber, refers to a state as a compulsory political association that organizes domination, and monopolizes the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within its territory. He argues that “sociologically the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends.”¹⁴⁷ He also emphasizes bureaucratic state order as especially important in its most rational development, precisely characteristic of the modern state.¹⁴⁸ His definition is very

¹⁴² Fred Halliday, *Nationalism, in: The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. by John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 359-373.

¹⁴³ Eric. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1983, pp. 1.

¹⁴⁴ Max Weber, 1972.

¹⁴⁵ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 161.

¹⁴⁶ Lung-Chu Chen, *An Introduction to Contemporary Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective*, Second Edition, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2000, pp. 25-26.

¹⁴⁷ See Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1958.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

persuasive, yet it seems that even he tends to limit the meaning of the state to political authority, not to say political leadership, narrowing the much broader meaning that can be derived from those qualifications mentioned above. Moreover, narrowing the meaning of the state to political authority is confusing when referring to the security of government, because it ignores other qualifications such as society, for example. Sometimes the security of a government is achieved only at a cost to society.

According to Hobsbawm, the equation “nation = state = people,” and especially sovereign people, unquestionably linked nation to territory, since the structure and definition of states were now essentially territorial.¹⁴⁹ The state ruled over the territorially defined “people.” But if we take into account Montevideo’s “definition,” the meaning of the term “state” is much broader than just nation (people) and territory. What about authorities (government), language, culture, tradition, and –most importantly – recognition by other states?¹⁵⁰ As is apparent, for some experts nation equals state, but for most others nation is only part of the state, and not always the most important part. In totalitarian regimes, “government” does not pay too much attention to patriotism and nation (society) at large; rather, it exercises power on the basis of force. Even in democratic regimes, however, the distinction is not always clear and obvious. Although a democratic government is elected by the people (not necessarily of one nation, but including national minorities as well), and from among the people themselves, when it comes time for the government to execute policy, it often does so at the cost of the nation (society). From a political perspective, which is crucial to this discussion, the relationship between state and nation is obvious. As Polish Marshal Jozef Pilsudski emphasized “It is the state which makes the nation, and not the nation the state.”¹⁵¹ Ivor Jennings puts the same point differently: “On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until someone decided who are

¹⁴⁹ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870. Program, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 19.

¹⁵⁰ The meaning of the term “government”, is also controversial. In the US e.g. government means whole authority of the state, including President and Congress. In Poland e.g. “government” is only part of state’s authority – executive one. Legislative and judicial part are not part of the government, not to mention President.

¹⁵¹ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870. Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 44.

the people.”¹⁵² A similar observation was made by Massimo d’Azeglio. He said: “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians.”¹⁵³

Perhaps as a compromise in order to reconcile both terms (“nation” and “state”), another term had to be invented: “nation-state.” This is the dominant political entity of the modern world, and as such is considered to be the primary unit not only of international relations, but of security studies as well. Surprisingly, the Penguin Dictionary of International Relations treats state and nation-state as the same, referring to both of them as the main actor in I.R.¹⁵⁴ At the beginning of the new millennium, however, such an interpretation is misleading. It is enough to look at the case of the United States to see that this approach does not make sense any more. The United States consists of 50 states (and one “special” District). Each state has its own government, laws, territory, and constitution, and sometimes conducts its own international relations. In spite of this arrangement, in the United States conducts international relations as a nation-state. If its members creates a federation resembling the United States, united Europe is expected to function in much the same way.

The modern nation-state originally developed in a liberal form, that is, “public” powers were concentrated into specialized state institutions (parliaments, bureaucracies), while leaving many “private” powers under the control of non-political institutions (free markets, private firms, families, etc.). That shift involved a double transformation of governing institutions such as the monarchy, which lost “private” powers (for example, the principal source of revenue from royal lands and the granting or possession of monopolies), while other institutions such as churches, guilds, and lordships lost their “public” powers to govern.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² W. I. Jennings, *The Approach to Self-Government*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956, quoted in: James Mayall, *Nationalism and international society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 41.

¹⁵³ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870. Program, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 44.

¹⁵⁴ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin Books, 1998, pp. 512.

¹⁵⁵ John Breuilly, *Approach to Nationalism*, in: *Nationalism. Critical Concepts in Political Science*, ed., London – New York: Routledge, 2000, Vol. I, pp. 324-352.

The development of an explicit idea of the nation-state as the only source of political functions was associated with a modern notion of sovereignty.¹⁵⁶ This idea also required a much clearer definition than just of the boundaries of the nation-state, particularly as the process of modern state formation in Europe occurred in the context of competition between a number of states. Apart from that, there was the political solution of citizenship.¹⁵⁷ A society of individuals was simultaneously defined as a polity of citizens. It was through participation in liberal and democratic institutions that a sense of commitment to the state could be generated. The “nation,” in this sense, was simply a body of citizens. What mattered was the political rights, not the cultural identities, of those who were citizens. A second solution was to stress the *collective* character of *society* within the nation-state. The establishment of a new nation-state requires a dislocation of the already existing larger unit(s).¹⁵⁸ A few questions appear here. What is the limitation of the principle of nations’ self-determination? Can every ethnic group demand its own political representation in the form of the state?¹⁵⁹

Allen Buchanan, quoting Ernest Gellner, makes the point, that “the normative nationalist principle is a recipe for limitless political fragmentation.”¹⁶⁰ The principle of self-determination, as expressed in U.N. declarations and resolutions, refers only to the peoples under colonial rule and excludes metropolitan territories. Therefore, the U.N. rejects any right of secession from an independent state.¹⁶¹ The 1970 Declaration makes this explicit by condemning “any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other state or country.”¹⁶² Nowadays, each nation and no other entity theoretically has a right to constitute a

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ In the year 2000 there were 195 states, and about 10, 000 nations all over the world. See www.cwis.org/satet.html

¹⁶⁰ Allen Buchanan, *Secession, Boulder*: Westview Press, 1991, p. 49.

¹⁶¹ Alexis Heraclites, *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics*, London: Frank Class, 1991, p. 21.

¹⁶² From the ‘Friendly Relations’ Declaration of 1970, quoted in Ibid.

separate state.¹⁶³ Yet, how can one decide that one group has the right to its own nation-state, while another does not?

In the world of “nation states,” has the nation captured the state or the state captured the nation? Although the answer is not obvious, one conclusion is clear. The nation-state remains the basic political unit. It continues to define the primary space in which political argument takes place.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, in the first century of the third millennium, and perhaps for the next few centuries, the nation-state will play the major role in inter-*national* relations, in the proper sense of inter-*state* relations, and will be the crucial, although not the only, actor in the security debate. As long as the state is the highest-level actor in the international security arena, the security of the state will be the most important level of analysis within security studies.

Last but not least, having analyzed the above terms, it is apparent there is a significant difference between the terms *national security* and *security of the state*, not to mention *security of the nation-state*, especially when taking into account the number of nations and states. Theoretically, therefore, security refers to nations and states as different objects. Although it was acceptable before and during the Cold War to be vague, the increasing complexity of nationalities within states, brought about by globalization, will require scholars and policymakers to specify these terms and concepts. *National security* cannot refer to one nation only when there are more within the state. By the same token, if it refers to all nations within the state including national minorities, it automatically refers to society. How will national security then relate to social (societal) security, which is considered to be a sector, not a level? Security of the state is the only persuasive paradigm at this level, and it should encompass all sectors, as states are still crucial players in the security arena.

¹⁶³ James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 40.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 152.

c. Homeland Security

Homeland security as a security paradigm was recently invented by the U.S. government in order to emphasize the need to defend its own territory. Although the newly created security concept, emphasizing asymmetric threats as the real security challenge for the United States, had been considered since 1997, concrete steps were taken as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when for the first time in more than half a century, the United States felt threatened on its own territory.

The fear that the world superpower could be the object of an unpredictable attack caused, in turn, a new approach to security, resulting not only in a new paradigm, but also real structures to deal with those challenges. Although the asymmetric approach does not seem to be persuasive, homeland security has become a reality.

According to the U.S. Constitution, the goal of homeland security is to provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty of Americans and their posterity, by relying on institutions at four levels: federal, state, local, and private.¹⁶⁵

The concept of *homeland* security is based on the responsibility for the defense of U.S. territory, while *national* security deals with threats abroad. In other words, homeland security is defined as the deterrence, prevention, and preemption of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, population, and infrastructure, as well as management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies.¹⁶⁶ Homeland defense and civil support, however, are subsets of homeland security.

This discussion leads to the question, Why was not it possible to deal with these “new” challenges within the national security paradigm, distinguishing internal and external aspects, as it is done everywhere else? What does this new approach bring, apart from creating a new Cabinet-level department and many other institutions? And finally, does homeland security as a new paradigm serve the interests of some elites (business and defense lobbies) to gain influence over many security-related aspects of government?

¹⁶⁵ Randy Larsen and Dave McIntyre, *A Primer on Homeland Security: Overview*, <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin/overview.htm>

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

All these questions seem to remain unanswered, and it will be difficult to establish clear relations between the national and homeland security paradigms, given that people from high political spheres are involved on both sides.

While homeland security is considered here as a separate issue, it is not included in the matrix for two reasons. First, it cannot be counted as an additional level because it relates directly to the state level, and traditional perceptions of national security in the broader meaning of the security of the state. From the practical point of view, however, it is still unclear how the paradigm of homeland security should relate to national security, as “homeland security comprises those actions that protect the common good domestically against attack,”¹⁶⁷ and national security “comprises those actions that protect and advance the common good internationally against attack.”¹⁶⁸ Is it necessary to create a new security paradigm and new institutions, only in order to separate the internal and external aspects of the security of the state?

4. Individual (Personal) Level

Personal security, or individual security, is, on the one hand, the most important from a social scientist’s point of view, but on the other hand, is the least important from a security studies point of view, though it is not without influence. The greatest attention to individual security is paid by human security. At the global level, however, human security, in relation to individual (personal) security, loses much of its justification, if it can be justified at all. Human security seems to be represented by associations of people or different organizations that aspire to help suffering people all over the world, by acting at a level above the state and collecting money from different sources. Human security should not be regarded as a sector because its issues are included in other sectors, and because, due to its purpose and circumstances, it has emerged within a coalition of only a few countries. At the individual level of analysis, societal security is a proper sector for consideration. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde treat this level as the bottom line of most

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

analysis in the social sciences.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, it seems that the bigger concern here is to establish relations between security studies and the rest of the social sciences, rather than to conduct security studies at the individual level. Practically speaking, it does not matter whether the issues of individual security are considered within the social sciences or as part of security studies. What matters is that they should be taken into account at the higher levels of decision making, even though in practice they are not dealt unless they cannot be avoided.

This research makes clear that both sectors and levels of analysis enable significant clarification of the complex field of security studies. The paradigms presented above show how disorganized the field is at this time, and the considerable effort that will be required to make sense of what is an increasingly important and complex sphere of human life. Clarification of the field of security studies will be helpful for both scientists and policymakers, although it could be said that an uncertain security environment is better for policymakers, as it gives them the maximum flexibility in decision making. What is more important, however, an organized security environment makes dealing with different security challenges easier and more effective.

¹⁶⁹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1998, pp. 6.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Security is a very complex and vaguely defined issue. To understand its real nature, and get a whole picture of its meaning, the definition and content of security must be rationally and clearly analyzed. The goal of this thesis, therefore, has been to reveal the true nature of security through a careful examination of both its definition and content.

Paradoxically, although it is possible to define security persuasively as “a real, or perceived, state when there are no threats or when existing threats do not pose a danger to the considered object,” it turns out that this definition is of no value from a practical point of view, as it does not help to clarify the issue. Such a definition could even be held as an axiom, and it would not change the image of the field of security studies.

This analysis of threats as indicators of security and reflecting the content of security studies, by contrast, provides a better understanding of the many issues that are considered under the rubric of security. This research also made distinctions between sectors of security, reflecting the different characters of threats, and the different levels of analysis that correspond to levels employed in the closely related field of international relations.

The matrices presented in this research illustrate three different approaches to security studies, starting from the field’s beginnings as a scientific discipline. They all show how security perceptions change together with the evolving world order and the character of threats. The rational approach, recommended by the author of this thesis, has universal applicability, as it covers all aspects of security at the current stage, and is open enough to account for future security challenges effectively both in practice and from a scientific perspective. This approach not only meets the requirements of many researchers for including new security paradigms, but also allows new sectors to be considered at different levels, making it possible to research their correlations.

Summing up, the two advantages of this research are obvious. First, by analyzing the existing definitions of security, this work shows that the main focus should be on the

content of security studies, because definitions of security are useless from a practical point of view. Second, it clarifies and organizes the current complex field of security studies, and makes it possible to group future security challenges according to the character of threats. Implementing a rational approach to security studies, however, will require the creation of a methodology to segregate threats into their proper sectors, and possibly in the future, to create new levels of analysis above the state level that can reflect trends in globalization.

Last but not least, the current relationship between security studies and other closely related disciplines, such as international relations or social science, is not clear, and issues often overlap. Moreover, the evolutionary character of the world will bring many new challenges for science to meet, in a much more complex environment. Therefore, such relations should be made as clear as possible, although this will not be an easy task. Given the inertial character of change, it seems that these relations are not likely to change within the near, or even distant, future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Robert H., *Asymmetric Warfare: Is the Army Ready?*,
<http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil>

Alkire, Sabina, *Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, 16 February 2002,
<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org.doc/frame.pdf>

Baldwin, David, "Thinking about threats," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15
(1971).

Baldwin, David, *Economic Statecraft*, Princeton University, Princeton, 1985.

Baldwin, David, "Security studies and the End of the Cold War," *World Politics*,
Vol.48, October 1995, No. 1.

Bagehot, Walter, *Physics and Politics*, London, 1887.

Bedeski, Robert, *Human Security, Knowledge, and the Evolution of the Northeast Asian State*, Center for Global Studies, University of Victoria, February 8, 2000,
<http://www.globalcentres.org>

Bichel, Anthony R., *Identity/Difference in Central Asia*, 1997,
<http://www.icarp.org/publications.html>

Brodie, Bernard, *Strategy as a Science*, World Politics 1 (1949).

Buchanan, Allen, *Secession*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Buzan, Barry, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2d ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

Chen, Lung-Chu, *An Introduction to Contemporary Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective*, Second Edition, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2000.

Cohen, Raymond, *Threat perception in International Crisis*, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.

Cohen, William S., "Secretary of Defense," *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, May 1997, Section II.

Cohen, William S., *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1999.

Deudney, Daniel, *The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security*, Millennium 19:3, 1990.

Deudney, Daniel, *Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking*, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 3, (April 1991).

Dunn, Frederick S., "The Present Course of International Relations Research," *World Politics* 2 (October 1949).

Etymology, <http://www.etymonline.com/t3etym.htm>

Evans, Graham, and Newnham, Jeffrey, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin Books, 1998.

Federal Bureau of Investigation, *National Security Division, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, Terrorism in the United States 1996*, <http://www.fbi.gov/publish/terror/terroris.pdf>

Fox, William T. R., "Interwar International Relation Research, The American Experience," *World Politics* 2 (October 1949).

Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism*, 1983.

Gills, B., "Myth, History and Political Identity" in *Cultural Anthropology* May 1992. Bichel, Anthony R., "Identity/Difference in Central Asia," *ICARP – Publications*, www.icarp.org

Gilpin, Robert, *The Political Economy in International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Haftendorn, Helga, "The security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," *International Studies Quarterly* (1991) 35.

Haftendorn, Helga, Keohane, Robert O., and Wallander, Celeste A., *Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space*, Oxford University Press, 1999.

Halliday, Fred, *Nationalism*, in: *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. by John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Heraclites, Alexis, *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics*, London: Frank Class, 1991.

Hobsbawm, E. J., *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870. Program, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Human Society, <http://www.project.org/tools/benchol/ch7/ch7.htm>

Jennings, W. I., *The Approach to Self-Government*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956, quoted in: James Mayall, *Nationalism and international society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 10 January 1995), IV-10 and IV-11.

Joint Strategy Review (Washington, DC: CJCS, 1999).

Keohane, Robert O., *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Kindleberger, Charles P., *The World in Depression 1929-1939*, London: Allen Lane, 1973.

King, Gary, and Murray, Christopher, *Rethinking Human Security*, Harvard University, May 4 2000, <http://www.gking.harvard.edu/files/hs.pdf>

Knorr, Klaus, *Threat Perception, in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, ed. K. Knorr, Lawrence, Kansas 1976.

Kolodziej, Edward A., "Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* (1992) 36, pp. 421-438.

Laqueur, Walter, "Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October, 1996.

Larsen, Randy, and McIntyre, Dave, *A Primer on Homeland Security: Overview*, <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin/overview.htm>

Lasswell, Harold D., *National Security and Individual Freedom*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950.

Levy, Marc A., "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?," *International Security* (1995) 20:2.

Mayall, James, *Nationalism and International Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

- McKenzie, Kenneth F. Jr., "The Revenge of The Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR," *McNair Paper* 62, pp. 2, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/html>
- Metz, Steven, "Strategic Asymmetry," *CGSC, Military Review*, July-August 2001.
- Moyano, Maria J., *Argentina's Lost Patrol, Armed Struggle, 1969-1979*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1995.
- Myers, Norman, *Ultimate security – The Environmental Bases of Political Stability*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1993.
- Nef, Jorge, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability*.
- Nunn, Sam, Rubin, Barnett R., Lubin Nancy, *Calming the Ferghana Valley*, Center for Preventive Action, New York , 1999.
- Paris, Roland, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (Fall 2001).
- Reed, Laura, and Tehranian, Majid, *Evolving Security Regimes, Worlds Apart*.
- Runci, Paul J., *Security and Environment: An Annotated Bibliography*, www.pln.gov
- Schwartau, Winn, *Fundamentals of Information Warfare, Asymmetrical Adversaries*, 2001, www.findarticles.com
- Shaw, Brian R., *When are Environmental Issues Security Issues?*, *Environmental Change and Security Project*, The Woodrow Wilson Center, Spring 1996.
- Shelton, Henry, H., *Information Operations: A strategy for Peace, The Decisive Edge in War*, Washington DC.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1999.
- Singer, David, "Threat Perception and the Armament Tension Dilemma," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, No. 1, (1958).
- Smoke, Richard, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to American Experience in The Cold War*, 3d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
- Short Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Tucker, Jonathan B., *Asymmetric Warfare*, <http://forum.ra.utk.edu/1999summer/asymmetric.htm>

- The Columbia Encyclopedia*, Sixth Edition, 2001,
<http://www.bartleby.com/65/te/terroris.html>
- The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, Second Edition, Unabridged, 1987.
- Ullman, Richard, “Redefining Security,” *International Security* (1983).
- United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, 1994, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
- Walt, Stephen M., “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (1991).
- Weber, Max, from *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Wæver, Ole, Buzan, Barry, Kalstrup, Morten, and Lemaitre, Pierre, *Identity, Migration and New Security Order in Europe*, London: Pinter, 1993.
- Walt, Stephen M., “The Search for Science of Strategy,” *International Security* (1987) 12.
- Webster New Collegiate Dictionary*, G.&C. Company, Springfield, Massachusetts, USA.
- Wehmeier, Sally, (ed), *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary*, Sixth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2201.
- Wolfers, Arnold, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (December 1952).
- Закон Российской Федерации, О безопасности* (N 2446-1 от 5 марта 1992).

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Professor Jeffrey Knopf
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
4. Professor Boris Keyser
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
5. Professor Zenon Obydzinski
Defense Language Institute
Monterey, California
6. Director Lech Kosciuk
Defense Policy Department of Polish MoD
ul. Krolewska 1
00-909 Warszawa
POLAND
7. Mieczyslaw Malec
ul. Korkowa 135C/116
04-549 Warszawa
POLAND